Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. ; Tvede, Mich; Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 102, 2017, p. 98–110.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hougaard, JL, Moreno-Ternero, JD, Tvede, M & Østerdal, LPR 2017, 'Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 102, pp. 98–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

APA

Hougaard, J. L., Moreno-Ternero, J. D., Tvede, M., & Østerdal, L. P. R. (2017). Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 98–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

Vancouver

Hougaard JL, Moreno-Ternero JD, Tvede M, Østerdal LPR. Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. Games and Economic Behavior. 2017;102:98–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

Author

Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. ; Tvede, Mich ; Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave. / Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2017 ; Vol. 102. pp. 98–110.

Bibtex

@article{becae545b3034d95b59c5deb7905e1e2,
title = "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture",
abstract = "We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue {\textquoteleft}bubbles up{\textquoteright} in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and Moreno-Ternero, {Juan D.} and Mich Tvede and {\O}sterdal, {Lars Peter Raahave}",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016",
language = "English",
volume = "102",
pages = "98–110",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

AU - Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.

AU - Tvede, Mich

AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.

AB - We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016

M3 - Journal article

VL - 102

SP - 98

EP - 110

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

ID: 169433722