Effort rights-based management

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

Effort rights-based management. / Squires, Dale ; Maunder, Mark ; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; Butterworth, Douglas; Caballero, Gonzalo; Clarke, Raymond; Ellefsen, Hans; Guillotreau, Patrice; Hampton, John; Hannesson, Rögnvaldur ; Havice, Elizabeth; Helvey, Mark; Herrick, Jr., Samuel ; Hoydal, Kjartan; Maharaj, Vishwanie; Metzner, Rebecca ; Mosqueira, Iago; Parma, Ana; Prieto-Bowen, Ivan; Restrepo, Victor ; Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi; Steinsham, Stein Ivar; Thunberg, Eric; del Valle, Ikerne; Vestergård, Niels.

I: Fish and Fisheries, Bind 18, Nr. 3, 2017, s. 440-465.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Squires, D, Maunder, M, Allen, R, Andersen, P, Astorkiza, K, Butterworth, D, Caballero, G, Clarke, R, Ellefsen, H, Guillotreau, P, Hampton, J, Hannesson, R, Havice, E, Helvey, M, Herrick, Jr., S, Hoydal, K, Maharaj, V, Metzner, R, Mosqueira, I, Parma, A, Prieto-Bowen, I, Restrepo, V, Sidique, SF, Steinsham, SI, Thunberg, E, del Valle, I & Vestergård, N 2017, 'Effort rights-based management', Fish and Fisheries, bind 18, nr. 3, s. 440-465. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12185

APA

Squires, D., Maunder, M., Allen, R., Andersen, P., Astorkiza, K., Butterworth, D., Caballero, G., Clarke, R., Ellefsen, H., Guillotreau, P., Hampton, J., Hannesson, R., Havice, E., Helvey, M., Herrick, Jr., S., Hoydal, K., Maharaj, V., Metzner, R., Mosqueira, I., ... Vestergård, N. (2017). Effort rights-based management. Fish and Fisheries, 18(3), 440-465. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12185

Vancouver

Squires D, Maunder M, Allen R, Andersen P, Astorkiza K, Butterworth D o.a. Effort rights-based management. Fish and Fisheries. 2017;18(3):440-465. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12185

Author

Squires, Dale ; Maunder, Mark ; Allen, Robin ; Andersen, Peder ; Astorkiza, Kepa ; Butterworth, Douglas ; Caballero, Gonzalo ; Clarke, Raymond ; Ellefsen, Hans ; Guillotreau, Patrice ; Hampton, John ; Hannesson, Rögnvaldur ; Havice, Elizabeth ; Helvey, Mark ; Herrick, Jr., Samuel ; Hoydal, Kjartan ; Maharaj, Vishwanie ; Metzner, Rebecca ; Mosqueira, Iago ; Parma, Ana ; Prieto-Bowen, Ivan ; Restrepo, Victor ; Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi ; Steinsham, Stein Ivar ; Thunberg, Eric ; del Valle, Ikerne ; Vestergård, Niels. / Effort rights-based management. I: Fish and Fisheries. 2017 ; Bind 18, Nr. 3. s. 440-465.

Bibtex

@article{d23bb843733d47a6934a45b0c0a62c99,
title = "Effort rights-based management",
abstract = "Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.",
keywords = "Catch rights, effort rights, fisheries management, total allowable catch, total allowable effort",
author = "Dale Squires and Mark Maunder and Robin Allen and Peder Andersen and Kepa Astorkiza and Douglas Butterworth and Gonzalo Caballero and Raymond Clarke and Hans Ellefsen and Patrice Guillotreau and John Hampton and R{\"o}gnvaldur Hannesson and Elizabeth Havice and Mark Helvey and {Herrick, Jr.}, Samuel and Kjartan Hoydal and Vishwanie Maharaj and Rebecca Metzner and Iago Mosqueira and Ana Parma and Ivan Prieto-Bowen and Victor Restrepo and Sidique, {Shaufique Fahmi} and Steinsham, {Stein Ivar} and Eric Thunberg and {del Valle}, Ikerne and Niels Vesterg{\aa}rd",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1111/faf.12185",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "440--465",
journal = "Fish and Fisheries",
issn = "1467-2960",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Effort rights-based management

AU - Squires, Dale

AU - Maunder, Mark

AU - Allen, Robin

AU - Andersen, Peder

AU - Astorkiza, Kepa

AU - Butterworth, Douglas

AU - Caballero, Gonzalo

AU - Clarke, Raymond

AU - Ellefsen, Hans

AU - Guillotreau, Patrice

AU - Hampton, John

AU - Hannesson, Rögnvaldur

AU - Havice, Elizabeth

AU - Helvey, Mark

AU - Herrick, Jr., Samuel

AU - Hoydal, Kjartan

AU - Maharaj, Vishwanie

AU - Metzner, Rebecca

AU - Mosqueira, Iago

AU - Parma, Ana

AU - Prieto-Bowen, Ivan

AU - Restrepo, Victor

AU - Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi

AU - Steinsham, Stein Ivar

AU - Thunberg, Eric

AU - del Valle, Ikerne

AU - Vestergård, Niels

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.

AB - Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM is discussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.

KW - Catch rights

KW - effort rights

KW - fisheries management

KW - total allowable catch

KW - total allowable effort

U2 - 10.1111/faf.12185

DO - 10.1111/faf.12185

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84995511075

VL - 18

SP - 440

EP - 465

JO - Fish and Fisheries

JF - Fish and Fisheries

SN - 1467-2960

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 180737509