IFRO Seminar: How many instruments do we really need? Tinbergen's rule reconsidered

Christian Elleby, Assistant Professor: How many instruments do we really need? Tinbergen's rule reconsidered

Abstract

Part of the existing economic literature on fisheries regulation focuses on solving several market failures with one policy instrument, which implies that fisheries regulation has several objectives. In this paper, we investigate the following three objectives of fisheries regulation: A) Correcting a stock externality; B) Raising public funds, and; C) Solving problems with uncertainty. We analyze the implications of combining a non-linear tax on harvest and individual transferable quotas to address these three objectives and argue that a tax alone can fulfill all three objectives simultaneously. This result can be related to Tinbergen’s rule, which states that multiple objectives require the use of multiple regulatory instruments. We show that one instrument (a tax based on the size of the harvest in this case) is enough to achieve several objectives.

About the seminars

The seminar series in Economics takes place every last Friday of the month in B.S. Jørgensen.

The seminar series offers an opportunity to get to know the work of your colleagues, to get feedback on your own papers and to enhance your professional network at IFRO.

If you would like to present something at the IFRO Seminars, feel free to contact Jens Leth Hougaard.