



## Presentation Outline

- **Introduction**
  - Problem statement
  - Research question
  - Theoretical framework
- **Progress**
  - Overall
  - Draft paper I - Key findings
- **Future plan**



## 1.1 Introduction

- **Management plan (SciFMP) is pre-requisite in the CF**
- **SFMP has less practical relevance & less likely to contribute to goal of CF**
  - Use of other form of knowledge (Lund et. al., 2013; Rutt et. al., 2014)
  - Resulting exclusion (Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013; Nightangle, 2005)
- **Why SFMP is still prominent in CF?**
- **Growing realization that SciFM is being used as political economic system of resource control in the CF**
- **However, scholars work mostly focus on CF governance**
  - Exclusions, marginalization & inequitable sharing of benefits
  - State discretionary control to retain power
  - Techno-bureaucratic domination

3

## Introduction.....

- **Role of SciFMP in shaping political and economic relations** between communities, forest bureaucracy vis a vis other actors is less explored
  - Political economy of scientific framing in the CF (Ojha et. al, 2007; Rutt et al, 2014)
- **Examine political economy of scientific framing in CF, focusing on who gain, who loose and how?**
  - Investigate **relationship between CFUGs and forest bureaucracy** in implementing SFMP
  - Examine **financial incentives for continued persistence** of scientific management in CF

4

## 1.2 Research Questions

**Why scientific forests management persists in CF?  
(What are political and economic rationale?)**

Research Hypothesis	Research Question
<b>Objective I: Investigate power relationships between CFUGs and forest bureaucracies in managing forest resources</b>	
Re-introduction of scientific forest management in the community forests will facilitate state control over community forests resources	1. Who will gain/is gaining from the re-introduction of scientific forestry in the community forests?
Forest bureaucracies are using SFMP instrumentally to control political autonomy of CF including cash flows	2. How is scientific framing legitimating forest bureaucracy to expand control over the CF resources, especially forest products and financial resources?

5


## Research Questions

Research Hypothesis	Research Question
<b>Objective II: Examine economic incentives for continued persistence of scientific management in CF</b>	
SFMP, including its revision provides financial incentives to forest bureaucracies to consolidate state control over CF	3. How has SFMP incentivised forest bureaucracies both politically and economically?
Scientific framing provides “win- win opportunities” to local elites and forest officials to gain economic access from the forests	4. Who benefits from forest product harvest and trade in CF and by what extent?

6

## 1.3 Theoretical Framework

- Political Economy Perspective
- Adopts **Bates (1981)** and **Blaikie (1985)** work as theoretical foundation
- **Political Economy is about** (Staniland, 1985)
  - Who gain
  - Who loose
  - How
- **Persistence of scientific managment**
  - Narratives
  - Actor's interests & collaboration
  - Power relationship
  - Incentives/Benefits



7

## 1.4 Research Site

- **Two mid hill districts of Nepal**
  - Lamjung
  - Tanahun
- **Four field level forest offices from 2 districts in a cluster**
  - Selected based on timber trade outside group
- **Six community forest users groups of intensive observation**
  - SciFM (2)
  - Conservative plan (2)
  - Timber trading (2+1)



## 2. Overall Progress

- **Course work almost completed**
- **Field work almost completed (80%)**
  - Conducted intensive field observation in six CFUGs for about 1 year
  - Rapid survey in 74 CFUGs
  - Stakeholder consultations (Forest officials, donor assisted projects and service providers)
- **Teaching at IoF**
  - Community forestry to Bachelor and Master student
- **Conference paper/abstract drafted and communicated**
  - Five drafted (2 approved & 3 under review)
- **Paper manuscript preparation on-going**
  - Four paper outline drafted
  - One draft manuscript prepared

## 2. Paper ?+

- **Paper I: Who gains from so-called Scientific Management of Community Forests in Nepal? A Case study from Western Hills**
  - *Bijendra Basnyat, Thorsten Treue, Ridish Pokharel & Yam Rumba*
- **Paper II: Bureaucratic Recentralization of Community Forestry in Western hills of Nepal**
  - *Bijendra Basnyat, Ridish Pokharel, Thorsten Treue*
- **Paper III: A Hidden Agenda of Stakeholders on Community Forest Management Plan Revision in the Western Hills of Nepal**
  - *Bijendra Basnyat, Thorsten Treue, Ridish Pokharel, Loknath Lamsal, Santosh Rayamajhi & Srijana Baral*
- **Paper IV: Actors Collusion and Hidden Incentive in Timber Trade from the Community Forests in the Western Region of Nepal**
  - *Bijendra Basnyat, Thorsten Treue, Ridish Pokharel, Pankaj Kayastha, Gajendra Shrestha*

## **Paper I : Who gains from so-called Scientific Management of Community Forests in Nepal? A Case study from Western Hills**

- **Why actors are interested with new management? What motivated them?**
- **Who regain power with the SciFM and how?**
- **What are likely consequences to the users?**

11

## **1. Problem Statement (issues of concern)**

- Politics between state and community is now entering in new phase with the SciFM in community forest
- Forest bureaucracy is using the SciFM to institute official knowledge and control and negotiate powers over forest resources & associated revenues with communities
- **SciFM is not likely to promote forest conservation in CFs and equitable economic development in CFUGs**
- CFUGs consider SciFM a series of **superfluous and burdensome bureaucratic measures** (Rutt et al., 2014).
- **The effect of recently introduced SciFM in shaping political and economic relations** is rather unexplored

12

## 2. Actor centered Power

- Actor-centred power is a social relationship where one actor (A) alters the behaviour of other actors without recognising other's actors will" (Krott et. al., 2014).
- Actor-centred power approach assume that power is exercised in day-to-day implementation
- Power is assumed only if the behaviour of actors is altered through coercion, incentives or information, trust (Krott et. al., 2014).
- However, power can also be exercised by avoiding decisions in problematic actions or non-implementation of the decisions
- Included fourth elements of power, i.e. non-decision making power in the actor centred power


## Actor centered power

Power elements	Altering behaviour by
Coercion	<b>Force, Physical action, threat for physical action or sources for physical action</b> <i>Example: Establishing authority through management plan; controlling harvest quantity</i>
Incentives	<b>Providing incentives or dis-incentives</b> <i>Example: Financial and material support or reward/ recognition</i>
Trust	<b>Alteration of another actor's behaviour due to his accepting information without verifying it</b> <i>Example Benefits from scientific management</i>
Non-decision making	<b>Alteration of another actor's behaviour due to not implementing decisions or decisions vaguely formulated for subsequent interpretation</b> <i>Example: Avoidance, ignorance, interpretation; Use of technically complex world, putting provisions beyond capacity of users to implement plan; ignoring users role</i>

Source: Modified from Brukas, & Hjortso 2004; Krott et. al., 2014

14

### 3. Study Area



- **Lamjung District, where SciFM in CF is implemented**
  - 2014 – Plan preparation (8 CF)
  - 2015 – Tree stem mapping
  - 2016 – Plan implementation (harvest)
- **Two CFs where SciFM is being implemented**
  - 1 CF with less 100 ha
  - 1 CF with greater than 100 ha
- **Studied CF**
  - Akala CF ( 45.92 ha)
  - Badahare CF (112.02 ha)

15

### 4. Research Methods

- **Research Design**
  - Exploratory research
  - Case study
  - CF as a case
- **Empirical Data Collection**
  - Mixed methods approach
  - Primary and secondary sources
  - Intensive field study
- **Study Methods**
  - SciFM Plan review & analyses
  - Observations
  - Focus group discussions
  - Stakeholder consultations
  - Financial cost & benefit analysis
  - Users survey (101 HHs)



## 5.1 Actors Interest

Stakeholders are either guided by the material benefits/financial gains or by political reasons for adopting scientific management

Stakeholders	Interests & motives
<b>Forest bureaucracy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forest productivity improvement/sustainable harvesting</li> <li>• Personnel benefits (Career and financial)</li> <li>• State revenue (15% tax + VAT from traders)</li> <li>• Image improvement (Status within department)</li> </ul>
<b>User committee</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revolving fund from DFO (plan preparation/implementation)</li> <li>• Use by EC to exclude others from leadership/influence</li> <li>• Strengthen relationship with forest bureaucrats</li> <li>• Guaranteed timber harvest (trees for felling are marked and mapped)</li> <li>• Negotiation with traders (e.g. Badahare Patel CF)</li> <li>• No investment (free of cost)/employment</li> </ul>
<b>Users</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timber supply (fallen trees are officially allowed to harvest in addition to Annual Allowable Harvest)</li> <li>• Increase fund for community development</li> </ul>
<b>Timber traders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Predicted harvest/increase business volume</li> <li>• Cost reduction/Profit (Harvesting, logging &amp; transport)</li> </ul>

## 5.2 Power Relations

Actors	Planning	Implementation	Harvesting
<b>Forest bureaucracy</b>	Trust Incentive Coercion In-direct power	In-direct power	Coercion In-direct power
<b>User committee</b>	Trust Incentive Coercion In-direct power	In-direct power	Coercion In-direct power
<b>Timber traders</b>	Trust		Incentive

- **Trust** : Sustainable management; Assured quantity of harvest; Higher production; Higher return
- **Incentives**: Technical support; Grants; Exposure visit, pre-finance
- **Coercion** : Use of authority ; new definition for tree; regulating distribution
- **Non-decision making** : Flaws technical provision requiring interpretation; need of technical staff support on plan implementation; no implementation of decisions; ignorance of decision; avoidance

## Power relations

- **Forest bureaucracy used all power elements to promote SciFM, however use depends on situation**
  - Plan preparation: All four elements
  - Plan implementation: Non-decision making
  - Harvesting: Coercion
- **Executive committee of the users operated like the extended arm of forest bureaucracy**
  - Executive committee were using all elements of power
- **Timber traders playing influential role**
  - Incentives

**Forest bureaucracy with support from executive committee is becoming more powerful in community forest**

## 5.3 Consequences

- **Plan established a need to “use official knowledge”**
  - Forestry graduates to implement plan
  - Consult with forest bureaucracy in every aspects
- **Users’ dependency on forest technicians increased**
  - Plan preparation, tree stem mapping, harvesting operation
  - Frequency of visits/ interactions increased (Both of DFO & CFs)
- **Bureaucratic control expanded or increased**
  - 2015: Users could not harvest timber in absence of plan (Both CFs)
  - 2016: Timber harvest reduced even after approval of the plan
- **User committee tend to control timber distribution within group**

**Forest bureaucracy including the CFUG EC has regained control over the CFs while users are even losing their access to timber**

## Consequences

- **Timber harvest volumes would increase slightly in SciFM compared to earlier management system**
- **Users must pay higher prices for timber to finance SciFM plan implementation**
  - Internal price should be at least Rs 260 /cft at 2015 constant price (instead of Rs 100/cft.)
- **State revenue from CF likely to increase because CFUGs need to increase outside sale**
  - VAT & taxes

Total timber harvest after 10 years

CF	SciFM (Cft)	Previous (Cft)
Badhare	25,713	21,600
Akala	6,263	6,150
Total	31,976	27,750
Annual	3,198	2,775



21

## Likely Consequences

- **Net financial benefits including return on investment is less in SciFM in comparison to the previous management**

This situation remains similar even if users sell timber outside group

	Selling to users only		Selling Outside users only <sup>NRS</sup>	
	SciFM	Previous	SciFM	Previous
Benefit Cost Ratio	<b>0.30</b>	<b>2.49</b>	<b>1.21</b>	<b>1.26</b>
Benefit @ 10%	2,198,758	1,888,133	17,812,996	15,205,100
Cost @ 10%	7,302,543	757,908	14,729,065	12,080,636
NPV @ 10%	<b>(5,103,785)</b>	<b>1,130,226</b>	<b>3,083,931</b>	<b>3,124,464</b>

- Estimated cost and benefit based on the SciFM Plan of CF
- Both cost and benefits are estimated at 2015 constant price
- Timber and firewood as main benefits obtained from plan
- Duration (10 years)

**Users will experience a net financial loss if they adopt SciFM in CF and they are likely to be forced to sell timber outside group to meet**

**management costs**

## 5.4 Discussions

---

- Ribot (2002), mentioned that scientific plan has circumscribed rural populations' opportunities and obligations with lack of new rights, but rather are given the opportunity to participate in a project which is not of their own design.
- Faya (2015) in Senegal found that technical domination can become indistinguishable from recentralization since it helps return the power over forests to the Forestry Department, while delegitimizing local governments and, by means of technical claims
- Forest bureaucracies retain control over forests resources primarily, by enforcing certain norms through the creation of 'forest-friendly' subjects and identities in environmental discourses (Arts, 2014; Ribot et al. 2006).

## Discussions

---

- Movuh & Schusser (2012) have similar findings in Cameroon, where the state used trust, incentive and coercion elements of power and defend their interests in CF, where all three elements could overlap each other.
- Mathews (2011), power of the forest bureaucracy lies in 'halting and hesitant' rather than hegemonic.
- Our finding contradicts Sakurai et. al., 2004 which reported that centralized management of natural forests, especially silviculture based management in Nepal leads to higher revenue and profit

## 5.5 Conclusions

- Forest bureaucracy is using scientific forest management narrative to re-centralize power in community forest, holding both *de-jure* and *de-facto* forest management
- Forest bureaucracy become more powerful in the community forests
- While users are yet to understand complexities and consequences of SciFM, forest bureaucracy is using the narratives for maximizing economic gain without proper and scientific analysis
- Forest user groups seemed to lost their decision rights (politically) as well as financially

25

Paper	
Paper II	<p><b>RQ: How is the relationship between forest bureaucracies and local communities in managing the CF?</b></p> <p>Using “<a href="#">power, accountability and incentive framework</a>”, paper explain on processes and mechanisms followed by the forest bureaucracy on controlling political autonomy of CF or recentralized decentralized forest management in Nepal.</p>
Paper III	<p><b>RQ: How forest management plan expiry includes its revision has incentivized forest bureaucracy, both politically and economically?</b></p> <p>Using the “<a href="#">political economy as an analytical framework</a>”, explain how forest bureaucracies are using forest management plan including its revision not only to consolidate state control over CF but also for their own financial gain or benefits.</p>
Paper IV	<p><b>RQ: The research will explain “how timber trade is being carried out from community forests and who have benefitted from the trade and by what extent”</b></p> <p>Using the <a href="#">access theory</a>, map different direct and indirect actors involved in the timber trade and explain how they have formed rent seeking collations during the timber trade operations from community forestry.</p>