Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor. / Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt.

Frederiksberg : Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2013. p. 1-8.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Fosgaard, TR 2013 'Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor' Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, pp. 1-8. <http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2013_8>

APA

Fosgaard, T. R. (2013). Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor. (pp. 1-8). Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. IFRO Working Paper No. 2013/8 http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2013_8

Vancouver

Fosgaard TR. Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor. Frederiksberg: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2013, p. 1-8.

Author

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt. / Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor. Frederiksberg : Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2013. pp. 1-8 (IFRO Working Paper; No. 2013/8).

Bibtex

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title = "Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one{\textquoteright}s favor",
abstract = "Based on a dice rolling task where participants can cheat on the outcome, this paper asks if default answers change dishonesty? The paper finds that various default answers have asymmetric effects. Compared to not having a default answer at all, providing a low default answer, or adding the expected mean as the default answer when participants report the outcome of the task do not affect behavior. Adding a high default answer, however, significantly increases the reported outcome.",
author = "Fosgaard, {Toke Reinholt}",
year = "2013",
language = "English",
series = "IFRO Working Paper",
publisher = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",
number = "2013/8",
pages = "1--8",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

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AB - Based on a dice rolling task where participants can cheat on the outcome, this paper asks if default answers change dishonesty? The paper finds that various default answers have asymmetric effects. Compared to not having a default answer at all, providing a low default answer, or adding the expected mean as the default answer when participants report the outcome of the task do not affect behavior. Adding a high default answer, however, significantly increases the reported outcome.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - IFRO Working Paper

SP - 1

EP - 8

BT - Asymmetric default bias in dishonesty – how defaults work but only when in one’s favor

PB - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

CY - Frederiksberg

ER -

ID: 46953282