Cooperation, framing and political attitudes

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Cooperation, framing and political attitudes. / Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland.

Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2017.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Fosgaard, TR, Hansen, LG & Wengström, ER 2017 'Cooperation, framing and political attitudes' Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. <http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2017_02>

APA

Fosgaard, T. R., Hansen, L. G., & Wengström, E. R. (2017). Cooperation, framing and political attitudes. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. IFRO Working Paper No. 2017/02 http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2017_02

Vancouver

Fosgaard TR, Hansen LG, Wengström ER. Cooperation, framing and political attitudes. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2017.

Author

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt ; Hansen, Lars Gårn ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / Cooperation, framing and political attitudes. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2017. (IFRO Working Paper; No. 2017/02).

Bibtex

@techreport{59ef6db6af3c45a0a7a78ef7cb625941,
title = "Cooperation, framing and political attitudes",
abstract = "This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.",
author = "Fosgaard, {Toke Reinholt} and Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn} and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
year = "2017",
language = "English",
series = "IFRO Working Paper",
publisher = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",
number = "2017/02",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Cooperation, framing and political attitudes

AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.

AB - This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - IFRO Working Paper

BT - Cooperation, framing and political attitudes

PB - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 174627886