Designing hunting regulation under population uncertainty and self-reporting
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Designing hunting regulation under population uncertainty and self-reporting. / Jensen, Frank; Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark.
In: Journal of Forest Economics, Vol. 24, 2016, p. 157-171.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Designing hunting regulation under population uncertainty and self-reporting
AU - Jensen, Frank
AU - Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl
AU - Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - A number of methods exist for estimating the size of animal populations. All methods generate an uncertain estimate of population size, and have different properties, which can be taken into account when designing regulation. We consider hunting regulation when the population size is uncertain and when the self-reported bag is used to estimate the population size. The properties of a population tax and a tax on self-reported bag are analyzed and we begin by considering a baseline situation with full certainty and no use of self-reporting for population size estimation. Here individual hunters self-report a bag on zero and a population tax alone can secure an optimum. Next we show that when facing uncertain population size, a risk-averse hunter will self-report part of the bag to reduce the uncertain population tax payment, making both tax instruments necessary for reaching an optimum. Finally, when self-reported bag is used to estimate population size, we also show that it is optimal for hunters to report a part of the bag and both instruments are again necessary for reaching an optimum.
AB - A number of methods exist for estimating the size of animal populations. All methods generate an uncertain estimate of population size, and have different properties, which can be taken into account when designing regulation. We consider hunting regulation when the population size is uncertain and when the self-reported bag is used to estimate the population size. The properties of a population tax and a tax on self-reported bag are analyzed and we begin by considering a baseline situation with full certainty and no use of self-reporting for population size estimation. Here individual hunters self-report a bag on zero and a population tax alone can secure an optimum. Next we show that when facing uncertain population size, a risk-averse hunter will self-report part of the bag to reduce the uncertain population tax payment, making both tax instruments necessary for reaching an optimum. Finally, when self-reported bag is used to estimate population size, we also show that it is optimal for hunters to report a part of the bag and both instruments are again necessary for reaching an optimum.
KW - Bag
KW - Hunting
KW - Regulatory instruments
KW - Self-reporting
KW - Stock uncertainty
U2 - 10.1016/j.jfe.2016.06.004
DO - 10.1016/j.jfe.2016.06.004
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:84979231439
VL - 24
SP - 157
EP - 171
JO - Journal of Forest Economics
JF - Journal of Forest Economics
SN - 1104-6899
ER -
ID: 166502090