Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: the case of green certificates

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Standard

Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets : the case of green certificates. / Amundsen, Eirik S; Nese, Gjermund.

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 173, No. 2, 06.2017, p. 301-321.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Amundsen, ES & Nese, G 2017, 'Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: the case of green certificates', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 173, no. 2, pp. 301-321. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14690820714372

APA

Amundsen, E. S., & Nese, G. (2017). Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: the case of green certificates. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 173(2), 301-321. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14690820714372

Vancouver

Amundsen ES, Nese G. Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: the case of green certificates. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2017 Jun;173(2):301-321. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14690820714372

Author

Amundsen, Eirik S ; Nese, Gjermund. / Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets : the case of green certificates. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 173, No. 2. pp. 301-321.

Bibtex

@article{e50ed9aa6881489893e7b40358319ad5,
title = "Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets: the case of green certificates",
abstract = "A market for tradable green certificates (TGCs) is strongly interwoven in the electricity market in that the producers of green electricity are also the suppliers of TGCs. Therefore, strategic interaction may result. We formulate an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneously functioning electricity and TGC markets, and focus on the role of market power (i.e., Stackelberg leadership). One result is that a certificate system faced with market power may collapse into a system of per-unit subsidies. Also, the model shows that TGCs may be an imprecise instrument for regulating the generation of green electricity.",
author = "Amundsen, {Eirik S} and Gjermund Nese",
year = "2017",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1628/093245616X14690820714372",
language = "English",
volume = "173",
pages = "301--321",
journal = "Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics",
issn = "0932-4569",
publisher = "Mohr Siebeck",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Market power in interactive environmental and energy markets

T2 - the case of green certificates

AU - Amundsen, Eirik S

AU - Nese, Gjermund

PY - 2017/6

Y1 - 2017/6

N2 - A market for tradable green certificates (TGCs) is strongly interwoven in the electricity market in that the producers of green electricity are also the suppliers of TGCs. Therefore, strategic interaction may result. We formulate an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneously functioning electricity and TGC markets, and focus on the role of market power (i.e., Stackelberg leadership). One result is that a certificate system faced with market power may collapse into a system of per-unit subsidies. Also, the model shows that TGCs may be an imprecise instrument for regulating the generation of green electricity.

AB - A market for tradable green certificates (TGCs) is strongly interwoven in the electricity market in that the producers of green electricity are also the suppliers of TGCs. Therefore, strategic interaction may result. We formulate an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneously functioning electricity and TGC markets, and focus on the role of market power (i.e., Stackelberg leadership). One result is that a certificate system faced with market power may collapse into a system of per-unit subsidies. Also, the model shows that TGCs may be an imprecise instrument for regulating the generation of green electricity.

U2 - 10.1628/093245616X14690820714372

DO - 10.1628/093245616X14690820714372

M3 - Journal article

VL - 173

SP - 301

EP - 321

JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

SN - 0932-4569

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 166464820