Nudge for (the public) good: how defaults can affect cooperation

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Standard

Nudge for (the public) good : how defaults can affect cooperation. / Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Piovesan, Marco.

In: PLOS ONE, Vol. 10, No. 12, e0145488, 2015.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Fosgaard, TR & Piovesan, M 2015, 'Nudge for (the public) good: how defaults can affect cooperation', PLOS ONE, vol. 10, no. 12, e0145488. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0145488

APA

Fosgaard, T. R., & Piovesan, M. (2015). Nudge for (the public) good: how defaults can affect cooperation. PLOS ONE, 10(12), [e0145488]. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0145488

Vancouver

Fosgaard TR, Piovesan M. Nudge for (the public) good: how defaults can affect cooperation. PLOS ONE. 2015;10(12). e0145488. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0145488

Author

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt ; Piovesan, Marco. / Nudge for (the public) good : how defaults can affect cooperation. In: PLOS ONE. 2015 ; Vol. 10, No. 12.

Bibtex

@article{66a6632968604f9098e3d14f71e80fc9,
title = "Nudge for (the public) good: how defaults can affect cooperation",
abstract = "In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.",
author = "Fosgaard, {Toke Reinholt} and Marco Piovesan",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1371/journal.pone.0145488",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
journal = "PLoS ONE",
issn = "1932-6203",
publisher = "Public Library of Science",
number = "12",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Nudge for (the public) good

T2 - how defaults can affect cooperation

AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt

AU - Piovesan, Marco

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.

AB - In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.

U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0145488

DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0145488

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 26717569

VL - 10

JO - PLoS ONE

JF - PLoS ONE

SN - 1932-6203

IS - 12

M1 - e0145488

ER -

ID: 150726475