Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review

Standard

Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods. / Hougaard, Jens Leth.

Game theory in management accounting: Implementing incentives and fairness. ed. / David Mueller; Ralf Trost. Springer, 2018. p. 287-300 (Contributions to Management Science).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hougaard, JL 2018, Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods. in D Mueller & R Trost (eds), Game theory in management accounting: Implementing incentives and fairness. Springer, Contributions to Management Science, pp. 287-300. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13

APA

Hougaard, J. L. (2018). Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods. In D. Mueller, & R. Trost (Eds.), Game theory in management accounting: Implementing incentives and fairness (pp. 287-300). Springer. Contributions to Management Science https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13

Vancouver

Hougaard JL. Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods. In Mueller D, Trost R, editors, Game theory in management accounting: Implementing incentives and fairness. Springer. 2018. p. 287-300. (Contributions to Management Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13

Author

Hougaard, Jens Leth. / Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods. Game theory in management accounting: Implementing incentives and fairness. editor / David Mueller ; Ralf Trost. Springer, 2018. pp. 287-300 (Contributions to Management Science).

Bibtex

@inbook{5ec54646824b4f9bae8981ce6f677481,
title = "Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods",
abstract = "A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service constraints.",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth}",
note = "The original version of this chapter was revised. An erratum to the chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_20 ",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-319-61602-5",
series = "Contributions to Management Science",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "287--300",
editor = "David Mueller and Ralf Trost",
booktitle = "Game theory in management accounting",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

N1 - The original version of this chapter was revised. An erratum to the chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_20

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service constraints.

AB - A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service constraints.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-3-319-61602-5

T3 - Contributions to Management Science

SP - 287

EP - 300

BT - Game theory in management accounting

A2 - Mueller, David

A2 - Trost, Ralf

PB - Springer

ER -

ID: 185439898