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Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods

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A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service constraints.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame theory in management accounting : Implementing incentives and fairness
EditorsDavid Mueller, Ralf Trost
Number of pages14
Publication date2018
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-61602-5
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-61603-2
Publication statusPublished - 2018
SeriesContributions to Management Science

Bibliographical note

The original version of this chapter was revised. An erratum to the chapter can be found at

ID: 185439898