Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management. / Kassahun, Habtamu Tilahun; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark; Swait, Joffre; Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 75, 2020, p. 105–136.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Kassahun, HT, Thorsen, BJ, Swait, J & Jacobsen, JB 2020, 'Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management', Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 75, pp. 105–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00390-3

APA

Kassahun, H. T., Thorsen, B. J., Swait, J., & Jacobsen, J. B. (2020). Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management. Environmental and Resource Economics, 75, 105–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00390-3

Vancouver

Kassahun HT, Thorsen BJ, Swait J, Jacobsen JB. Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2020;75:105–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00390-3

Author

Kassahun, Habtamu Tilahun ; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark ; Swait, Joffre ; Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl. / Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management. In: Environmental and Resource Economics. 2020 ; Vol. 75. pp. 105–136.

Bibtex

@article{db267bda975a4c7ca4fbc09398a3e325,
title = "Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management",
abstract = "Several discrete choice experiment studies have investigated issues in the design of incentive programs to enhance the provision of ecosystem services. In these studies, ownership of land is usually private, and landowners make decisions independently of each other. However, the assumption of independence may be invalid when decision making involves a spatial setting and social networks. This study presents a new approach that accounts for social cooperation and preference interdependence across farmers in a land management context with mixed ownership. We formulate an econometric model of implicit choice set formation that accounts for (1) farmers{\textquoteright} expectations regarding mutual positive benefits from cooperation in an integrated land management system, and (2) the potential interdependence of preferences across farmers within the same socio-spatial group. We show that cooperation expectations matter for the decision of whether to engage in cooperative management and also for welfare estimates. Our model can identify sources of heterogeneities arising from cooperation expectations in ways that would not be possible using a reduced-form choice model. The assumption of independence should be checked routinely in similar settings to avoid potential endogeneity problems in discrete choice models when dealing with data that have a social-spatial dimension.",
keywords = "Choice set formation, Common pool, Ethiopia, Hybrid choice, Land management, Latent variable, Social interaction, Social network",
author = "Kassahun, {Habtamu Tilahun} and Thorsen, {Bo Jellesmark} and Joffre Swait and Jacobsen, {Jette Bredahl}",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1007/s10640-019-00390-3",
language = "English",
volume = "75",
pages = "105–136",
journal = "Environmental and Resource Economics",
issn = "0924-6460",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Social cooperation in the context of integrated private and common land management

AU - Kassahun, Habtamu Tilahun

AU - Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark

AU - Swait, Joffre

AU - Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Several discrete choice experiment studies have investigated issues in the design of incentive programs to enhance the provision of ecosystem services. In these studies, ownership of land is usually private, and landowners make decisions independently of each other. However, the assumption of independence may be invalid when decision making involves a spatial setting and social networks. This study presents a new approach that accounts for social cooperation and preference interdependence across farmers in a land management context with mixed ownership. We formulate an econometric model of implicit choice set formation that accounts for (1) farmers’ expectations regarding mutual positive benefits from cooperation in an integrated land management system, and (2) the potential interdependence of preferences across farmers within the same socio-spatial group. We show that cooperation expectations matter for the decision of whether to engage in cooperative management and also for welfare estimates. Our model can identify sources of heterogeneities arising from cooperation expectations in ways that would not be possible using a reduced-form choice model. The assumption of independence should be checked routinely in similar settings to avoid potential endogeneity problems in discrete choice models when dealing with data that have a social-spatial dimension.

AB - Several discrete choice experiment studies have investigated issues in the design of incentive programs to enhance the provision of ecosystem services. In these studies, ownership of land is usually private, and landowners make decisions independently of each other. However, the assumption of independence may be invalid when decision making involves a spatial setting and social networks. This study presents a new approach that accounts for social cooperation and preference interdependence across farmers in a land management context with mixed ownership. We formulate an econometric model of implicit choice set formation that accounts for (1) farmers’ expectations regarding mutual positive benefits from cooperation in an integrated land management system, and (2) the potential interdependence of preferences across farmers within the same socio-spatial group. We show that cooperation expectations matter for the decision of whether to engage in cooperative management and also for welfare estimates. Our model can identify sources of heterogeneities arising from cooperation expectations in ways that would not be possible using a reduced-form choice model. The assumption of independence should be checked routinely in similar settings to avoid potential endogeneity problems in discrete choice models when dealing with data that have a social-spatial dimension.

KW - Choice set formation

KW - Common pool

KW - Ethiopia

KW - Hybrid choice

KW - Land management

KW - Latent variable

KW - Social interaction

KW - Social network

U2 - 10.1007/s10640-019-00390-3

DO - 10.1007/s10640-019-00390-3

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85076203748

VL - 75

SP - 105

EP - 136

JO - Environmental and Resource Economics

JF - Environmental and Resource Economics

SN - 0924-6460

ER -

ID: 232978270