The landing obligation in view of different management regimes

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

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The landing obligation in view of different management regimes. / Frost, Hans Staby; Hoff, Ayoe.

In: Fisheries Research, Vol. 195, 2017, p. 202-213.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Frost, HS & Hoff, A 2017, 'The landing obligation in view of different management regimes', Fisheries Research, vol. 195, pp. 202-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.013

APA

Frost, H. S., & Hoff, A. (2017). The landing obligation in view of different management regimes. Fisheries Research, 195, 202-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.013

Vancouver

Frost HS, Hoff A. The landing obligation in view of different management regimes. Fisheries Research. 2017;195:202-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.013

Author

Frost, Hans Staby ; Hoff, Ayoe. / The landing obligation in view of different management regimes. In: Fisheries Research. 2017 ; Vol. 195. pp. 202-213.

Bibtex

@article{f882fd3452d547c593d664a318ba3777,
title = "The landing obligation in view of different management regimes",
abstract = "The European Union adopted a landing obligation in 2015 implying that all catches of fish subject to quota management must be landed. We compare and contrast the economic consequences for fisheries of the landing obligation in view of the management system on which it is super-imposed. Four types of management are assessed: open access, shared quota, individual transferable quotas and economically optimal fishery. A standard non-linear programming bio-economic model is applied, providing illustrative numerical examples based on hypothetical parameter values. It is shown that the landing obligation has the strongest influence on both industry profitability and catch of unwanted species in the case of management with shared non-transferable quotas. In addition, the move from management with shared quotas to individual transferable quotas (ITQ) increases industry profitability and reduces unwanted catches. It is concluded that the effects of introducing the landing obligation in ITQ management systems are complex, but small.",
author = "Frost, {Hans Staby} and Ayoe Hoff",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.013",
language = "English",
volume = "195",
pages = "202--213",
journal = "Fisheries Research",
issn = "0165-7836",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The landing obligation in view of different management regimes

AU - Frost, Hans Staby

AU - Hoff, Ayoe

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - The European Union adopted a landing obligation in 2015 implying that all catches of fish subject to quota management must be landed. We compare and contrast the economic consequences for fisheries of the landing obligation in view of the management system on which it is super-imposed. Four types of management are assessed: open access, shared quota, individual transferable quotas and economically optimal fishery. A standard non-linear programming bio-economic model is applied, providing illustrative numerical examples based on hypothetical parameter values. It is shown that the landing obligation has the strongest influence on both industry profitability and catch of unwanted species in the case of management with shared non-transferable quotas. In addition, the move from management with shared quotas to individual transferable quotas (ITQ) increases industry profitability and reduces unwanted catches. It is concluded that the effects of introducing the landing obligation in ITQ management systems are complex, but small.

AB - The European Union adopted a landing obligation in 2015 implying that all catches of fish subject to quota management must be landed. We compare and contrast the economic consequences for fisheries of the landing obligation in view of the management system on which it is super-imposed. Four types of management are assessed: open access, shared quota, individual transferable quotas and economically optimal fishery. A standard non-linear programming bio-economic model is applied, providing illustrative numerical examples based on hypothetical parameter values. It is shown that the landing obligation has the strongest influence on both industry profitability and catch of unwanted species in the case of management with shared non-transferable quotas. In addition, the move from management with shared quotas to individual transferable quotas (ITQ) increases industry profitability and reduces unwanted catches. It is concluded that the effects of introducing the landing obligation in ITQ management systems are complex, but small.

U2 - 10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.013

DO - 10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.013

M3 - Journal article

VL - 195

SP - 202

EP - 213

JO - Fisheries Research

JF - Fisheries Research

SN - 0165-7836

ER -

ID: 181390061