A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions

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A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions. / Hansen, Lars Gårn.

In: Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 61, 101166, 2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Hansen, LG 2020, 'A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions', Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 61, 101166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101166

APA

Hansen, L. G. (2020). A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions. Resource and Energy Economics, 61, [101166]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101166

Vancouver

Hansen LG. A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions. Resource and Energy Economics. 2020;61. 101166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101166

Author

Hansen, Lars Gårn. / A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions. In: Resource and Energy Economics. 2020 ; Vol. 61.

Bibtex

@article{f2678c1af6ae41d090211bef5978a5f5,
title = "A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions",
abstract = "Regulating externalities from pollution is difficult when the regulator can not observe individual firms’ externality generation. Taxing the aggregate emissions of a group of polluters, which can often be observed, has been suggested. However, these taxes are vulnerable to collusion and strategic behavior, and they generate distorted entry-exit incentives. To address these disadvantages, I suggest combining an aggregate tax mechanism with the quota payment mechanism suggested by Montero for allocating emission quotas. The suggested tax system induces compliance with quotas and solves the noted problems for a subset of these regulation problems.",
author = "Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn}",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101166",
language = "English",
volume = "61",
journal = "Resource and Energy Economics",
issn = "0928-7655",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Montero payment mechanism for regulating non-point pollution emissions

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Regulating externalities from pollution is difficult when the regulator can not observe individual firms’ externality generation. Taxing the aggregate emissions of a group of polluters, which can often be observed, has been suggested. However, these taxes are vulnerable to collusion and strategic behavior, and they generate distorted entry-exit incentives. To address these disadvantages, I suggest combining an aggregate tax mechanism with the quota payment mechanism suggested by Montero for allocating emission quotas. The suggested tax system induces compliance with quotas and solves the noted problems for a subset of these regulation problems.

AB - Regulating externalities from pollution is difficult when the regulator can not observe individual firms’ externality generation. Taxing the aggregate emissions of a group of polluters, which can often be observed, has been suggested. However, these taxes are vulnerable to collusion and strategic behavior, and they generate distorted entry-exit incentives. To address these disadvantages, I suggest combining an aggregate tax mechanism with the quota payment mechanism suggested by Montero for allocating emission quotas. The suggested tax system induces compliance with quotas and solves the noted problems for a subset of these regulation problems.

U2 - 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101166

DO - 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101166

M3 - Journal article

VL - 61

JO - Resource and Energy Economics

JF - Resource and Energy Economics

SN - 0928-7655

M1 - 101166

ER -

ID: 241364947