Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes. / Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 158, 2019, p. 416-427.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Fosgaard, TR, Hansen, LG & Wengström, ER 2019, 'Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes', Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 158, pp. 416-427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010

APA

Fosgaard, T. R., Hansen, L. G., & Wengström, E. R. (2019). Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 158, 416-427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010

Vancouver

Fosgaard TR, Hansen LG, Wengström ER. Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;158:416-427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010

Author

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt ; Hansen, Lars Gårn ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019 ; Vol. 158. pp. 416-427.

Bibtex

@article{b44f9a00e7de47589699b234c4aae8f6,
title = "Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes",
abstract = "This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.",
author = "Fosgaard, {Toke Reinholt} and Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn} and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010",
language = "English",
volume = "158",
pages = "416--427",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes

AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.

AB - This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 158

SP - 416

EP - 427

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

ID: 211951684