Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Prices vs. percentages : Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation. / Heimvik, Arild; Amundsen, Eirik S.

In: Energy Economics, Vol. 99, 105316, 2021.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Heimvik, A & Amundsen, ES 2021, 'Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation', Energy Economics, vol. 99, 105316. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105316

APA

Heimvik, A., & Amundsen, E. S. (2021). Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation. Energy Economics, 99, [105316]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105316

Vancouver

Heimvik A, Amundsen ES. Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation. Energy Economics. 2021;99. 105316. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105316

Author

Heimvik, Arild ; Amundsen, Eirik S. / Prices vs. percentages : Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation. In: Energy Economics. 2021 ; Vol. 99.

Bibtex

@article{a2d753b37a194564a823c4afa06ab0bf,
title = "Prices vs. percentages: Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation",
abstract = "We consider a regulator who seeks to achieve a specific target path of greenhouse gas emission reductions in the electricity sector. Generation stems from two sources: renewable (green) and fossil (black) sources, which cause emissions. We construct a dynamic model and explore the suitability of a tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme for solving this problem. Further, we study the resulting incentives for construction of new green generation capacity. We provide a novel contribution to the TGC literature by using a dynamic model that allows analyses of time-related issues that are inaccessible with static models. Further, we focus explicitly on calibration of the time path of percentage requirements. We devise two specific time paths and show that the use of a TGC scheme can achieve a specific dynamic emission target but always results in overinvestment in new green generation capacity. We also derive results from using an emission fee and a green subsidy, compare the different instruments, and conduct a welfare ranking. A TGC scheme is not as cost-effective as an optimal emission fee but is more effective than a green subsidy.",
author = "Arild Heimvik and Amundsen, {Eirik S.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105316",
language = "English",
volume = "99",
journal = "Energy Economics",
issn = "0140-9883",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Prices vs. percentages

T2 - Use of tradable green certificates as an instrument of greenhouse gas mitigation

AU - Heimvik, Arild

AU - Amundsen, Eirik S.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - We consider a regulator who seeks to achieve a specific target path of greenhouse gas emission reductions in the electricity sector. Generation stems from two sources: renewable (green) and fossil (black) sources, which cause emissions. We construct a dynamic model and explore the suitability of a tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme for solving this problem. Further, we study the resulting incentives for construction of new green generation capacity. We provide a novel contribution to the TGC literature by using a dynamic model that allows analyses of time-related issues that are inaccessible with static models. Further, we focus explicitly on calibration of the time path of percentage requirements. We devise two specific time paths and show that the use of a TGC scheme can achieve a specific dynamic emission target but always results in overinvestment in new green generation capacity. We also derive results from using an emission fee and a green subsidy, compare the different instruments, and conduct a welfare ranking. A TGC scheme is not as cost-effective as an optimal emission fee but is more effective than a green subsidy.

AB - We consider a regulator who seeks to achieve a specific target path of greenhouse gas emission reductions in the electricity sector. Generation stems from two sources: renewable (green) and fossil (black) sources, which cause emissions. We construct a dynamic model and explore the suitability of a tradable green certificate (TGC) scheme for solving this problem. Further, we study the resulting incentives for construction of new green generation capacity. We provide a novel contribution to the TGC literature by using a dynamic model that allows analyses of time-related issues that are inaccessible with static models. Further, we focus explicitly on calibration of the time path of percentage requirements. We devise two specific time paths and show that the use of a TGC scheme can achieve a specific dynamic emission target but always results in overinvestment in new green generation capacity. We also derive results from using an emission fee and a green subsidy, compare the different instruments, and conduct a welfare ranking. A TGC scheme is not as cost-effective as an optimal emission fee but is more effective than a green subsidy.

U2 - 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105316

DO - 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105316

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85105930307

VL - 99

JO - Energy Economics

JF - Energy Economics

SN - 0140-9883

M1 - 105316

ER -

ID: 271621241