Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Standard

Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals : Empirical evidence from Ethiopia. / Kahsay, Goytom Abraha; Kassie, Workineh Asmare; Beyene, Abebe Damte; Hansen, Lars Gårn.

In: Land Use Policy, Vol. 112, 105798, 2022.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Kahsay, GA, Kassie, WA, Beyene, AD & Hansen, LG 2022, 'Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia', Land Use Policy, vol. 112, 105798. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105798

APA

Kahsay, G. A., Kassie, W. A., Beyene, A. D., & Hansen, L. G. (2022). Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia. Land Use Policy, 112, [105798]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105798

Vancouver

Kahsay GA, Kassie WA, Beyene AD, Hansen LG. Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia. Land Use Policy. 2022;112. 105798. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105798

Author

Kahsay, Goytom Abraha ; Kassie, Workineh Asmare ; Beyene, Abebe Damte ; Hansen, Lars Gårn. / Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals : Empirical evidence from Ethiopia. In: Land Use Policy. 2022 ; Vol. 112.

Bibtex

@article{40cbc25df4254062bf685bb570634f5f,
title = "Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia",
abstract = "Developing countries often design programs that bundle poverty reduction and environment goals. One such program is the Ethiopian food-for-work program in which participants get food or cash in return for participating in environmental protection, typically, forest and soil conservation works. While the economic impacts have been well investigated, little is known about the program{\textquoteright}s environmental impact and the willingness to participate in such programs. We elicit Ethiopian farmers{\textquoteright} willingness to participate in a hypothetical afforestation program that mimics the components of the Ethiopian food-for-work program. We find that introducing food incentives decreases willingness to participate in the program. The participation rate, however, increases with an increase in the proportion of individuals selected for the food incentive. Our data points to signaling as the likely channel for the non-linearity of the participation rate in response to an increase in the share of food incentive recipients. These results suggest that (1) food-for-work programs could have unintended negative environmental effects and (2) directions for design reform that could mitigate such negative effects.",
author = "Kahsay, {Goytom Abraha} and Kassie, {Workineh Asmare} and Beyene, {Abebe Damte} and Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn}",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105798",
language = "English",
volume = "112",
journal = "Land Use Policy",
issn = "0264-8377",
publisher = "Pergamon Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pro-environmental behavior under bundled environmental and poverty reduction goals

T2 - Empirical evidence from Ethiopia

AU - Kahsay, Goytom Abraha

AU - Kassie, Workineh Asmare

AU - Beyene, Abebe Damte

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Developing countries often design programs that bundle poverty reduction and environment goals. One such program is the Ethiopian food-for-work program in which participants get food or cash in return for participating in environmental protection, typically, forest and soil conservation works. While the economic impacts have been well investigated, little is known about the program’s environmental impact and the willingness to participate in such programs. We elicit Ethiopian farmers’ willingness to participate in a hypothetical afforestation program that mimics the components of the Ethiopian food-for-work program. We find that introducing food incentives decreases willingness to participate in the program. The participation rate, however, increases with an increase in the proportion of individuals selected for the food incentive. Our data points to signaling as the likely channel for the non-linearity of the participation rate in response to an increase in the share of food incentive recipients. These results suggest that (1) food-for-work programs could have unintended negative environmental effects and (2) directions for design reform that could mitigate such negative effects.

AB - Developing countries often design programs that bundle poverty reduction and environment goals. One such program is the Ethiopian food-for-work program in which participants get food or cash in return for participating in environmental protection, typically, forest and soil conservation works. While the economic impacts have been well investigated, little is known about the program’s environmental impact and the willingness to participate in such programs. We elicit Ethiopian farmers’ willingness to participate in a hypothetical afforestation program that mimics the components of the Ethiopian food-for-work program. We find that introducing food incentives decreases willingness to participate in the program. The participation rate, however, increases with an increase in the proportion of individuals selected for the food incentive. Our data points to signaling as the likely channel for the non-linearity of the participation rate in response to an increase in the share of food incentive recipients. These results suggest that (1) food-for-work programs could have unintended negative environmental effects and (2) directions for design reform that could mitigate such negative effects.

U2 - 10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105798

DO - 10.1016/j.landusepol.2021.105798

M3 - Journal article

VL - 112

JO - Land Use Policy

JF - Land Use Policy

SN - 0264-8377

M1 - 105798

ER -

ID: 281596845