The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences
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This paper considers the Gale-Shapley model with interdependent preferences. Women's preferences over men are common knowledge but whether or not a man is acceptable depends on the preferences of men which are private information. It is shown that no ex-post incentive-compatible and ex-post stable matching rules exist. A characterization of ex-post incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational and ex-post nonbossy matching rules in terms of modified priority rules is provided.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Artikelnummer | 2040005 |
Tidsskrift | International Game Theory Review |
Vol/bind | 22 |
Udgave nummer | 2 |
Antal sider | 16 |
ISSN | 0219-1989 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2020 |
Begivenhed | International Symposium on Operations Research and Game Theory - Modeling and Computation - Delhi, Indien Varighed: 9 jan. 2018 → 11 jan. 2018 |
Konference
Konference | International Symposium on Operations Research and Game Theory - Modeling and Computation |
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Land | Indien |
By | Delhi |
Periode | 09/01/2018 → 11/01/2018 |
ID: 249866400