Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm

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Standard

Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm. / Keerus, Külli; Gjerris, Mickey; Röcklinsberg, Helena.

I: Society & Animals, Bind 27, Nr. 5-6, 2019, s. 469–486.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Keerus, K, Gjerris, M & Röcklinsberg, H 2019, 'Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm', Society & Animals, bind 27, nr. 5-6, s. 469–486. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341467

APA

Keerus, K., Gjerris, M., & Röcklinsberg, H. (2019). Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm. Society & Animals, 27(5-6), 469–486. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341467

Vancouver

Keerus K, Gjerris M, Röcklinsberg H. Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm. Society & Animals. 2019;27(5-6):469–486. https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341467

Author

Keerus, Külli ; Gjerris, Mickey ; Röcklinsberg, Helena. / Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm. I: Society & Animals. 2019 ; Bind 27, Nr. 5-6. s. 469–486.

Bibtex

@article{0ee6f3d6f0494acb974e8732a5335e1a,
title = "Deprivation as un-experienced harm?: A critical analysis of Tom Regan{\textquoteright}s principle of harm",
abstract = "Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan{\textquoteright}s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan{\textquoteright}s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan{\textquoteright}s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan{\textquoteright}s own possible argumentative mistakes.",
author = "K{\"u}lli Keerus and Mickey Gjerris and Helena R{\"o}cklinsberg",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1163/15685306-12341467",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "469–486",
journal = "Society & Animals",
issn = "1063-1119",
publisher = "Brill",
number = "5-6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Deprivation as un-experienced harm?

T2 - A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm

AU - Keerus, Külli

AU - Gjerris, Mickey

AU - Röcklinsberg, Helena

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.

AB - Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.

U2 - 10.1163/15685306-12341467

DO - 10.1163/15685306-12341467

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 469

EP - 486

JO - Society & Animals

JF - Society & Animals

SN - 1063-1119

IS - 5-6

ER -

ID: 181387562