"Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana

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Standard

"Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana. / Hansen, Christian Pilegaard; Rutt, Rebecca Leigh; Acheampong, Emmanuel .

I: Forest Policy and Economics, Bind 96, 2018, s. 75-82.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Hansen, CP, Rutt, RL & Acheampong, E 2018, '"Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana', Forest Policy and Economics, bind 96, s. 75-82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.012

APA

Hansen, C. P., Rutt, R. L., & Acheampong, E. (2018). "Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana. Forest Policy and Economics, 96, 75-82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.012

Vancouver

Hansen CP, Rutt RL, Acheampong E. "Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana. Forest Policy and Economics. 2018;96:75-82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.012

Author

Hansen, Christian Pilegaard ; Rutt, Rebecca Leigh ; Acheampong, Emmanuel . / "Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana. I: Forest Policy and Economics. 2018 ; Bind 96. s. 75-82.

Bibtex

@article{796176d22d7945caa97461893c187e50,
title = "{"}Experimental{"} or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana",
abstract = "In this paper, we challenge recent positive assessments made of the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), through a case study of their implementation in Ghana. We do this through a review of the rich literature on forest governance in Ghana and the results of 160 semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in the country. While we agree that the VPA has helped establish new fora for dialogue in the forest sector in Ghana, we argue that it has not fundamentally changed the existing forest governance regime. Specifically, the VPA implementation has not changed tree tenure and benefit sharing practices, and by extension, the forestry concession system that for over 8 decades has failed to secure forest sustainability and social equity. The changes introduced through the VPA implementation – the Timber Legality Assurance System, updated forest management plans, and an artisanal milling strategy, largely represent technical fixes to deeply political processes that have long upheld unsustainable practices. Other changes such as enhanced enforcement of Social Responsibility Agreements and more transparent allocations of timber rights are improvements, but they do not fundamentally change the tenure and benefit sharing arrangement, which by any standard is inequitable. Our evidence particularly contradicts Overdevest and Zeitlin's (2016, 2018) depiction of the country's VPA experience as an emerging {\textquoteleft}experimentalist{\textquoteright} forest governance entailing substantive dialogue, recursive problem-solving, and policy learning. At the contrary, and paradoxically, we argue that the VPA implementation in Ghana serves to stabilize and reproduce the very forest governance regime that it set out to reform– a process that is much less {\textquoteleft}experimental{\textquoteright}, and much more business as usual.",
author = "Hansen, {Christian Pilegaard} and Rutt, {Rebecca Leigh} and Emmanuel Acheampong",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.012",
language = "English",
volume = "96",
pages = "75--82",
journal = "Forest Policy and Economics",
issn = "1389-9341",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - "Experimental" or business as usual? Implementing the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) voluntary partnership agreement in Ghana

AU - Hansen, Christian Pilegaard

AU - Rutt, Rebecca Leigh

AU - Acheampong, Emmanuel

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - In this paper, we challenge recent positive assessments made of the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), through a case study of their implementation in Ghana. We do this through a review of the rich literature on forest governance in Ghana and the results of 160 semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in the country. While we agree that the VPA has helped establish new fora for dialogue in the forest sector in Ghana, we argue that it has not fundamentally changed the existing forest governance regime. Specifically, the VPA implementation has not changed tree tenure and benefit sharing practices, and by extension, the forestry concession system that for over 8 decades has failed to secure forest sustainability and social equity. The changes introduced through the VPA implementation – the Timber Legality Assurance System, updated forest management plans, and an artisanal milling strategy, largely represent technical fixes to deeply political processes that have long upheld unsustainable practices. Other changes such as enhanced enforcement of Social Responsibility Agreements and more transparent allocations of timber rights are improvements, but they do not fundamentally change the tenure and benefit sharing arrangement, which by any standard is inequitable. Our evidence particularly contradicts Overdevest and Zeitlin's (2016, 2018) depiction of the country's VPA experience as an emerging ‘experimentalist’ forest governance entailing substantive dialogue, recursive problem-solving, and policy learning. At the contrary, and paradoxically, we argue that the VPA implementation in Ghana serves to stabilize and reproduce the very forest governance regime that it set out to reform– a process that is much less ‘experimental’, and much more business as usual.

AB - In this paper, we challenge recent positive assessments made of the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), through a case study of their implementation in Ghana. We do this through a review of the rich literature on forest governance in Ghana and the results of 160 semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in the country. While we agree that the VPA has helped establish new fora for dialogue in the forest sector in Ghana, we argue that it has not fundamentally changed the existing forest governance regime. Specifically, the VPA implementation has not changed tree tenure and benefit sharing practices, and by extension, the forestry concession system that for over 8 decades has failed to secure forest sustainability and social equity. The changes introduced through the VPA implementation – the Timber Legality Assurance System, updated forest management plans, and an artisanal milling strategy, largely represent technical fixes to deeply political processes that have long upheld unsustainable practices. Other changes such as enhanced enforcement of Social Responsibility Agreements and more transparent allocations of timber rights are improvements, but they do not fundamentally change the tenure and benefit sharing arrangement, which by any standard is inequitable. Our evidence particularly contradicts Overdevest and Zeitlin's (2016, 2018) depiction of the country's VPA experience as an emerging ‘experimentalist’ forest governance entailing substantive dialogue, recursive problem-solving, and policy learning. At the contrary, and paradoxically, we argue that the VPA implementation in Ghana serves to stabilize and reproduce the very forest governance regime that it set out to reform– a process that is much less ‘experimental’, and much more business as usual.

U2 - 10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.012

DO - 10.1016/j.forpol.2018.08.012

M3 - Journal article

VL - 96

SP - 75

EP - 82

JO - Forest Policy and Economics

JF - Forest Policy and Economics

SN - 1389-9341

ER -

ID: 201560768