Better us later than me now —: Regulatee-size and time-inconsistency as determinants of demand for environmental policies
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
Better us later than me now — : Regulatee-size and time-inconsistency as determinants of demand for environmental policies. / Alt, Marius.
In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Vol. 108, 102144, 2024.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Better us later than me now —
T2 - Regulatee-size and time-inconsistency as determinants of demand for environmental policies
AU - Alt, Marius
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - To adequately design and implement effective environmental policies, it is paramount for policymakers to understand preferences for regulatory instruments and the factors that facilitate their implementation. In this study, I experimentally investigate two possible facilitators of the implementation of environmental policies. I assess (1) whether interventions are demanded as commitment devices if their implementation is delayed to the future, and (2) whether the demand for interventions increases if the policy not only affects the self but also others. The results show that a large fraction of individuals demand regulation. Particularly, I find evidence that participants who are sophisticated about their time-inconsistent prosocial preferences use interventions to commit to future pro-environmental behavior. When the intervention is also imposed on other participants, paternalistic conditional cooperators increase their demand most strongly. In a welfare analysis, I show that particularly delay-effects entail large welfare gains, whereas imposing policies also on other individuals can have negative welfare effects in the case of stringent policies.
AB - To adequately design and implement effective environmental policies, it is paramount for policymakers to understand preferences for regulatory instruments and the factors that facilitate their implementation. In this study, I experimentally investigate two possible facilitators of the implementation of environmental policies. I assess (1) whether interventions are demanded as commitment devices if their implementation is delayed to the future, and (2) whether the demand for interventions increases if the policy not only affects the self but also others. The results show that a large fraction of individuals demand regulation. Particularly, I find evidence that participants who are sophisticated about their time-inconsistent prosocial preferences use interventions to commit to future pro-environmental behavior. When the intervention is also imposed on other participants, paternalistic conditional cooperators increase their demand most strongly. In a welfare analysis, I show that particularly delay-effects entail large welfare gains, whereas imposing policies also on other individuals can have negative welfare effects in the case of stringent policies.
KW - Economic interventions
KW - Endogenous institutions
KW - Environmental regulation
KW - Pro-environmental behavior
KW - Real effort
U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102144
DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102144
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85181245746
VL - 108
JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
SN - 2214-8043
M1 - 102144
ER -
ID: 389903985