Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Regulating multiple externalities : the case of Nordic fisheries. / Waldo, Staffan; Jensen, Frank; Nielsen, Max; Ellefsen, Hans; Hallgrimsson, Jónas; Hammarlund, Cecilia; Hermansen, Oystein; Isaksen, John.

In: Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2016, p. 233-257.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Waldo, S, Jensen, F, Nielsen, M, Ellefsen, H, Hallgrimsson, J, Hammarlund, C, Hermansen, O & Isaksen, J 2016, 'Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries', Marine Resource Economics, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 233-257. https://doi.org/10.1086/685286

APA

Waldo, S., Jensen, F., Nielsen, M., Ellefsen, H., Hallgrimsson, J., Hammarlund, C., Hermansen, O., & Isaksen, J. (2016). Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries. Marine Resource Economics, 31(2), 233-257. https://doi.org/10.1086/685286

Vancouver

Waldo S, Jensen F, Nielsen M, Ellefsen H, Hallgrimsson J, Hammarlund C et al. Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries. Marine Resource Economics. 2016;31(2):233-257. https://doi.org/10.1086/685286

Author

Waldo, Staffan ; Jensen, Frank ; Nielsen, Max ; Ellefsen, Hans ; Hallgrimsson, Jónas ; Hammarlund, Cecilia ; Hermansen, Oystein ; Isaksen, John. / Regulating multiple externalities : the case of Nordic fisheries. In: Marine Resource Economics. 2016 ; Vol. 31, No. 2. pp. 233-257.

Bibtex

@article{863243ecdac949a598d23136c57cba9c,
title = "Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries",
abstract = "Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.",
keywords = "Climate change, economic efficiency, externalities, fisheries, fuel efficiency, regulation",
author = "Staffan Waldo and Frank Jensen and Max Nielsen and Hans Ellefsen and J{\'o}nas Hallgrimsson and Cecilia Hammarlund and Oystein Hermansen and John Isaksen",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1086/685286",
language = "English",
volume = "31",
pages = "233--257",
journal = "Marine Resource Economics",
issn = "0738-1360",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Regulating multiple externalities

T2 - the case of Nordic fisheries

AU - Waldo, Staffan

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Nielsen, Max

AU - Ellefsen, Hans

AU - Hallgrimsson, Jónas

AU - Hammarlund, Cecilia

AU - Hermansen, Oystein

AU - Isaksen, John

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.

AB - Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.

KW - Climate change

KW - economic efficiency

KW - externalities

KW - fisheries

KW - fuel efficiency

KW - regulation

U2 - 10.1086/685286

DO - 10.1086/685286

M3 - Journal article

VL - 31

SP - 233

EP - 257

JO - Marine Resource Economics

JF - Marine Resource Economics

SN - 0738-1360

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 160979291