Conservation by corruption: The hidden yet regulated economy in Nepal's community forest timber sector
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Conservation by corruption : The hidden yet regulated economy in Nepal's community forest timber sector. / Basnyat, Bijendra; Treue, Thorsten; Pokharel, Ridish Kumar; Kayastha, Pankaj Kumar; Shrestha, Gajendra Kumar.
In: Forest Policy and Economics, Vol. 149, 102917, 2023.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Conservation by corruption
T2 - The hidden yet regulated economy in Nepal's community forest timber sector
AU - Basnyat, Bijendra
AU - Treue, Thorsten
AU - Pokharel, Ridish Kumar
AU - Kayastha, Pankaj Kumar
AU - Shrestha, Gajendra Kumar
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Through the case of commercial timber production in Nepal's community forests, we uncover and explain how effective anti-corruption and harvest regulation have produced a kind of 'allowed' corruption that promotes forest conservation. An ethnographic study in four community forests and in-depth interviews of nearly 200 actors along the Sal (Shorea robusta) timber commodity chain showed that all actors participated in a highly organised form of collusive corruption. Anti-corruption officials call this practice "corruption without illegality" because it does not involve unauthorised harvest in community forests. Instead, it suppresses producer prices through legally required but rigged timber auctions that generate windfall profits, which sawmill owners share with upstream actors to ensure a steady supply of raw logs. Local-level timber brokers connect community forest user groups to sawmill owners. They also operate as stealth conveyers of unofficial payments to forestry officials and other upstream actors because they can camouflage such cash flows as transaction costs. Anti-corruption authorities enforce formal timber harvesting rules, which deters forestry officials from getting involved in overharvesting schemes. However, these same rules, plus some legal posturing, allow forestry officials to extract rents from legally harvested logs at minimum risk. This is hardly a coincidence because it enables the central administration to regulate difficult-to-control field-level forestry officials' behaviour without curtailing their access to informal incomes. Forest user groups lose out, but they could increase their timber income substantially by exercising their powers to decide whether or not to harvest timber. Elevating timber auction floor prices through state intervention is also feasible.
AB - Through the case of commercial timber production in Nepal's community forests, we uncover and explain how effective anti-corruption and harvest regulation have produced a kind of 'allowed' corruption that promotes forest conservation. An ethnographic study in four community forests and in-depth interviews of nearly 200 actors along the Sal (Shorea robusta) timber commodity chain showed that all actors participated in a highly organised form of collusive corruption. Anti-corruption officials call this practice "corruption without illegality" because it does not involve unauthorised harvest in community forests. Instead, it suppresses producer prices through legally required but rigged timber auctions that generate windfall profits, which sawmill owners share with upstream actors to ensure a steady supply of raw logs. Local-level timber brokers connect community forest user groups to sawmill owners. They also operate as stealth conveyers of unofficial payments to forestry officials and other upstream actors because they can camouflage such cash flows as transaction costs. Anti-corruption authorities enforce formal timber harvesting rules, which deters forestry officials from getting involved in overharvesting schemes. However, these same rules, plus some legal posturing, allow forestry officials to extract rents from legally harvested logs at minimum risk. This is hardly a coincidence because it enables the central administration to regulate difficult-to-control field-level forestry officials' behaviour without curtailing their access to informal incomes. Forest user groups lose out, but they could increase their timber income substantially by exercising their powers to decide whether or not to harvest timber. Elevating timber auction floor prices through state intervention is also feasible.
KW - Actors
KW - Anti -corruption
KW - Decentralisation
KW - Illegality
KW - RECENTRALISATION
KW - GOVERNMENTS
KW - ACCESS
KW - POLICY
KW - THREAT
KW - GUIDE
KW - POWER
U2 - 10.1016/j.forpol.2023.102917
DO - 10.1016/j.forpol.2023.102917
M3 - Journal article
VL - 149
JO - Forest Policy and Economics
JF - Forest Policy and Economics
SN - 1389-9341
M1 - 102917
ER -
ID: 339129667