Preferences as Heuristics

Open seminar with Alexandros Rigos from Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO).

The seminar is open, and everyone can participate.

You can read more about 'Preferences as Heuristics' here. 

In this seminar, Alexadros Rigos and Erik Mohlin will present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can evolve as an adaptation to her social environment.

"Our key assumptions are that the decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to evaluate which of two actions yields the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective preference for one of the actions.

A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not taking it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are typically better off (in objective terms) if they are endowed with subjective preferences that deviate from maximisation of expected objective payoff. Importantly, if DMs can evaluate actions perfectly, they do not develop such biases.

The results extend in an intuitive manner to n-player, two-strategy supermodular games. Our framework can be used to interpret preferences for specific actions or strategies (e.g., conditional cooperation, truth-telling, or norm-following) as psychological and cultural consequences of material incentives and social organisation."

When and where?

The seminar takes place on the 4th of September 2025 at 14.00-15.00 in Auditorium Kongelunden, 1st floor, Rolighedsvej 23, 1958 Frederiksberg.