Robust Mechanism Design on Networks with Externalities
Open seminar with Kohmei Makihara, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
The seminar is open, and everyone can participate.
About the seminar:
Decision makers often seek to allocate resources efficiently without perfect information. The paper presented at this seminar examines the allocation of a good with positive externalities, without monetary transfers.
Agents in a network know their own and their neighbors’ valuations. The principal designs a mechanism asking agents to report these valuations, aiming to allocate the good to the highest-valuation agent.
Positive externalities align incentives: even non-recipients prefer efficient allocation.
We study robust implementation, requiring efficiency without assumptions on valuation distributions or beliefs about distant agents. An efficient mechanism exists if and only if at least two agents are connected to everyone. If agents avoid weakly dominated strategies, one such agent suffices.
These results show when robust implementation is feasible and guide how decision makers can shape networks to achieve efficient allocation.
You can read more about 'Robust Mechanism Design on Networks with Externalities' here.
When and where?
The seminar takes place on the 19th of September 2025 at 14.00-15.00 in Auditorium Kongelunden, 1st floor, Rolighedsvej 23, 1958 Frederiksberg.