Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
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Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. ; Tvede, Mich; Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 102, 2017, p. 98–110.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth
AU - Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
AU - Tvede, Mich
AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter Raahave
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.
AB - We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016
M3 - Journal article
VL - 102
SP - 98
EP - 110
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
ER -
ID: 169433722