Risky business: Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks?

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Risky business : Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks? / Mazzocco, Vivianne; Uchida, Hirotsugu; Weir, Michael J.; Bidwell, David.

In: Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2024, p. 1-20.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Mazzocco, V, Uchida, H, Weir, MJ & Bidwell, D 2024, 'Risky business: Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks?', Marine Resource Economics, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1086/727496

APA

Mazzocco, V., Uchida, H., Weir, M. J., & Bidwell, D. (2024). Risky business: Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks? Marine Resource Economics, 39(1), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1086/727496

Vancouver

Mazzocco V, Uchida H, Weir MJ, Bidwell D. Risky business: Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks? Marine Resource Economics. 2024;39(1):1-20. https://doi.org/10.1086/727496

Author

Mazzocco, Vivianne ; Uchida, Hirotsugu ; Weir, Michael J. ; Bidwell, David. / Risky business : Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks?. In: Marine Resource Economics. 2024 ; Vol. 39, No. 1. pp. 1-20.

Bibtex

@article{6369dd941bf34be0bfd0d4f3cd9ba3f8,
title = "Risky business: Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks?",
abstract = "This study focuses on market risks oyster farmers face when a Vibrio outbreak occurs from a neighboring farm and investigates the effectiveness of a potential marketing strategy. We conducted an auction field experiment where participants bid on entr{\'e}es of raw oysters and raw clams over six rounds with two information interventions a press article reporting Vibrio outbreak (negative) and a description of local oyster farmers{\textquoteright} effort in outbreak prevention (positive). We found that negative information given first significantly reduced willingness to pay (WTP) for oysters, but subsequent positive information restored WTP. Negative information given as second treatment showed no impact, suggesting positive information{\textquoteright}s shielding effect. For clams we found evidence of negative information spillover and red-flag effect of positive information. These suggest that oyster farmers could mitigate oyster{\textquoteright}s demand shocks by disseminating their safe handling practices to consumers, however some caution is warranted for its impact on other shellfish demand.",
author = "Vivianne Mazzocco and Hirotsugu Uchida and Weir, {Michael J.} and David Bidwell",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.1086/727496",
language = "English",
volume = "39",
pages = "1--20",
journal = "Marine Resource Economics",
issn = "0738-1360",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Risky business

T2 - Can oyster farmers defend themselves against foodborne illness–related demand shocks?

AU - Mazzocco, Vivianne

AU - Uchida, Hirotsugu

AU - Weir, Michael J.

AU - Bidwell, David

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - This study focuses on market risks oyster farmers face when a Vibrio outbreak occurs from a neighboring farm and investigates the effectiveness of a potential marketing strategy. We conducted an auction field experiment where participants bid on entrées of raw oysters and raw clams over six rounds with two information interventions a press article reporting Vibrio outbreak (negative) and a description of local oyster farmers’ effort in outbreak prevention (positive). We found that negative information given first significantly reduced willingness to pay (WTP) for oysters, but subsequent positive information restored WTP. Negative information given as second treatment showed no impact, suggesting positive information’s shielding effect. For clams we found evidence of negative information spillover and red-flag effect of positive information. These suggest that oyster farmers could mitigate oyster’s demand shocks by disseminating their safe handling practices to consumers, however some caution is warranted for its impact on other shellfish demand.

AB - This study focuses on market risks oyster farmers face when a Vibrio outbreak occurs from a neighboring farm and investigates the effectiveness of a potential marketing strategy. We conducted an auction field experiment where participants bid on entrées of raw oysters and raw clams over six rounds with two information interventions a press article reporting Vibrio outbreak (negative) and a description of local oyster farmers’ effort in outbreak prevention (positive). We found that negative information given first significantly reduced willingness to pay (WTP) for oysters, but subsequent positive information restored WTP. Negative information given as second treatment showed no impact, suggesting positive information’s shielding effect. For clams we found evidence of negative information spillover and red-flag effect of positive information. These suggest that oyster farmers could mitigate oyster’s demand shocks by disseminating their safe handling practices to consumers, however some caution is warranted for its impact on other shellfish demand.

U2 - 10.1086/727496

DO - 10.1086/727496

M3 - Journal article

VL - 39

SP - 1

EP - 20

JO - Marine Resource Economics

JF - Marine Resource Economics

SN - 0738-1360

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 375548543