TY - JOUR

T1 - Property rights regimes in complex fishery management systems

T2 - A choice experiment application

AU - Kanchanaroek, Yingluk

AU - Termansen, Mette

AU - Quinn, Claire

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - The Tonle Sap wetland fishery was previously divided into 3 different management zones for conservation, open access fishing and private fishing. Rights to the private fishing zone involved auctions for exclusive rights to temporarily designated plots. This paper aims to explore the auction-based system by investigating how this fishery management system affects different groups of small scale fishermen and how different characteristics of the fishing lots affect the bidding. A choice experiment approach was used to model fishermen's choices in a hypothetical auction market by offering fishermen the choice between purchasing different potential fishing lots and a no purchase option, implying fishing only in the communal fishing grounds. The preferred latent class model with two segments of fishermen showed that the bidding behavior of the more privileged group out-competes the other group irrespective of the lot characteristics. This result suggests that it is unlikely that the redesign of the auction system itself would be an effective way of securing access to fishing resources for the two observed groups of fishermen. This implies that open access fishing grounds and/or other regulations may also be needed in future management as they serve an important role for the poorer segments.

AB - The Tonle Sap wetland fishery was previously divided into 3 different management zones for conservation, open access fishing and private fishing. Rights to the private fishing zone involved auctions for exclusive rights to temporarily designated plots. This paper aims to explore the auction-based system by investigating how this fishery management system affects different groups of small scale fishermen and how different characteristics of the fishing lots affect the bidding. A choice experiment approach was used to model fishermen's choices in a hypothetical auction market by offering fishermen the choice between purchasing different potential fishing lots and a no purchase option, implying fishing only in the communal fishing grounds. The preferred latent class model with two segments of fishermen showed that the bidding behavior of the more privileged group out-competes the other group irrespective of the lot characteristics. This result suggests that it is unlikely that the redesign of the auction system itself would be an effective way of securing access to fishing resources for the two observed groups of fishermen. This implies that open access fishing grounds and/or other regulations may also be needed in future management as they serve an important role for the poorer segments.

KW - Choice experiment

KW - Fishery management

KW - Heterogeneous preferences

KW - Latent class model

KW - Privatizing fishery resources

KW - Tonle Sap wetlands

U2 - 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.05.014

DO - 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.05.014

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84880390813

VL - 93

SP - 363

EP - 373

JO - Ecological Economics

JF - Ecological Economics

SN - 0921-8009

ER -