Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries
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Regulating multiple externalities : the case of Nordic fisheries. / Waldo, Staffan; Jensen, Frank; Nielsen, Max; Ellefsen, Hans; Hallgrimsson, Jónas; Hammarlund, Cecilia; Hermansen, Oystein; Isaksen, John.
In: Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2016, p. 233-257.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Regulating multiple externalities
T2 - the case of Nordic fisheries
AU - Waldo, Staffan
AU - Jensen, Frank
AU - Nielsen, Max
AU - Ellefsen, Hans
AU - Hallgrimsson, Jónas
AU - Hammarlund, Cecilia
AU - Hermansen, Oystein
AU - Isaksen, John
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.
AB - Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.
KW - Climate change
KW - economic efficiency
KW - externalities
KW - fisheries
KW - fuel efficiency
KW - regulation
U2 - 10.1086/685286
DO - 10.1086/685286
M3 - Journal article
VL - 31
SP - 233
EP - 257
JO - Marine Resource Economics
JF - Marine Resource Economics
SN - 0738-1360
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 160979291