Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes
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Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes. / Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland.
I: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Bind 158, 2019, s. 416-427.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes
AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt
AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn
AU - Wengström, Erik Roland
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.
AB - This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010
M3 - Journal article
VL - 158
SP - 416
EP - 427
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
SN - 0167-2681
ER -
ID: 211951684