Regulation of aquaculture production
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Regulation of aquaculture production. / Jensen, Frank; Nielsen, Rasmus; Meilby, Henrik.
I: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Bind 25, 2023, s. 161–204.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Regulation of aquaculture production
AU - Jensen, Frank
AU - Nielsen, Rasmus
AU - Meilby, Henrik
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - In this paper, we investigate the economically optimal regulation of aquaculture production. The time between releasing and harvesting fish (rotation time) from a pond is an important decision variable for an aquaculture producer, and we use rotation time as a regulatory variable. By using a general model as a starting point, we construct a basic model for a private and social optimum assuming an infinite time horizon. The quality of fish is explicitly included in our basic model, and we show that a total tax scheme, collected at the end of each rotation, equal to the total discounted damage costs secures a social optimum. We also discuss the implications of several modeling extensions for our regulatory recommendations, but we require that the extensions can be captured within the general model. Examples of modeling extensions include differences between socially and privately fixed costs and discount rates.
AB - In this paper, we investigate the economically optimal regulation of aquaculture production. The time between releasing and harvesting fish (rotation time) from a pond is an important decision variable for an aquaculture producer, and we use rotation time as a regulatory variable. By using a general model as a starting point, we construct a basic model for a private and social optimum assuming an infinite time horizon. The quality of fish is explicitly included in our basic model, and we show that a total tax scheme, collected at the end of each rotation, equal to the total discounted damage costs secures a social optimum. We also discuss the implications of several modeling extensions for our regulatory recommendations, but we require that the extensions can be captured within the general model. Examples of modeling extensions include differences between socially and privately fixed costs and discount rates.
U2 - 10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w
DO - 10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w
M3 - Journal article
VL - 25
SP - 161
EP - 204
JO - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
JF - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
SN - 1432-847X
ER -
ID: 326741353