Renewable resource management under asymmetric information: the fisheries case
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Renewable resource management under asymmetric information : the fisheries case. / Jensen, Frank; Andersen, Peder; Nielsen, Max.
I: Food Economics, Bind 9, Nr. Supplement 5, 2013, s. 37-46.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Renewable resource management under asymmetric information
T2 - the fisheries case
AU - Jensen, Frank
AU - Andersen, Peder
AU - Nielsen, Max
N1 - Published online 11 Dec 2013
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - Asymmetric information between fishermen and the regulator is important within fisheries. The regulator may have less information about stock sizes, prices, costs, effort, productivity and catches than fishermen. With asymmetric information, a strong analytical tool is principal-agent analysis. In this paper, we study asymmetric information about productivity within a principal-agent framework and a tax on fishing effort is considered. It is shown that a second best optimum can be achieved if the effort tax is designed such that low-productivity agents rent is exhausted, while high-productivity agents receive an information rent. The information rent is equivalent to the total incentive cost. The incentive costs arise as we want to reveal the agent's type.
AB - Asymmetric information between fishermen and the regulator is important within fisheries. The regulator may have less information about stock sizes, prices, costs, effort, productivity and catches than fishermen. With asymmetric information, a strong analytical tool is principal-agent analysis. In this paper, we study asymmetric information about productivity within a principal-agent framework and a tax on fishing effort is considered. It is shown that a second best optimum can be achieved if the effort tax is designed such that low-productivity agents rent is exhausted, while high-productivity agents receive an information rent. The information rent is equivalent to the total incentive cost. The incentive costs arise as we want to reveal the agent's type.
U2 - 10.1080/2164828X.2013.859578
DO - 10.1080/2164828X.2013.859578
M3 - Journal article
VL - 9
SP - 37
EP - 46
JO - Food Economics
JF - Food Economics
SN - 2164-828X
IS - Supplement 5
ER -
ID: 99998984