Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences

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Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk : Its Causes and Policy Consequences. / Nordström, Leif Jonas; Thunström, Linda ; van ’t Veld, Klaas ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Ehmke, Mariah .

Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2018.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Nordström, LJ, Thunström, L, van ’t Veld, K, Shogren, JF & Ehmke, M 2018 'Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences' Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Nordström, L. J., Thunström, L., van ’t Veld, K., Shogren, J. F., & Ehmke, M. (2018). Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. IFRO Working Paper No. 2018/09

Vancouver

Nordström LJ, Thunström L, van ’t Veld K, Shogren JF, Ehmke M. Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2018.

Author

Nordström, Leif Jonas ; Thunström, Linda ; van ’t Veld, Klaas ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Ehmke, Mariah . / Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk : Its Causes and Policy Consequences. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2018. (IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2018/09).

Bibtex

@techreport{9c843b54e7cb433ebfbdd928be49ab96,
title = "Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences",
abstract = "We examine the causes and policy consequences of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. We find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. We find that strategically ignorant subjects downplay the health risk of their preferred meal being high-calorie, which we formally show is consistent with the theory of optimal expectations about risk. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effectiveness of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume about the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.",
author = "Nordstr{\"o}m, {Leif Jonas} and Linda Thunstr{\"o}m and {van {\textquoteright}t Veld}, Klaas and Shogren, {Jason F.} and Mariah Ehmke",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
series = "IFRO Working Paper ",
number = "2018/09",
publisher = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk

T2 - Its Causes and Policy Consequences

AU - Nordström, Leif Jonas

AU - Thunström, Linda

AU - van ’t Veld, Klaas

AU - Shogren, Jason F.

AU - Ehmke, Mariah

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - We examine the causes and policy consequences of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. We find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. We find that strategically ignorant subjects downplay the health risk of their preferred meal being high-calorie, which we formally show is consistent with the theory of optimal expectations about risk. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effectiveness of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume about the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.

AB - We examine the causes and policy consequences of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. We find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. We find that strategically ignorant subjects downplay the health risk of their preferred meal being high-calorie, which we formally show is consistent with the theory of optimal expectations about risk. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effectiveness of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume about the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - IFRO Working Paper

BT - Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk

PB - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 203048630