Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences
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Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk : Its Causes and Policy Consequences. / Nordström, Leif Jonas; Thunström, Linda ; van ’t Veld, Klaas ; Shogren, Jason F. ; Ehmke, Mariah .
Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2018.Research output: Working paper › Research
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk
T2 - Its Causes and Policy Consequences
AU - Nordström, Leif Jonas
AU - Thunström, Linda
AU - van ’t Veld, Klaas
AU - Shogren, Jason F.
AU - Ehmke, Mariah
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - We examine the causes and policy consequences of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. We find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. We find that strategically ignorant subjects downplay the health risk of their preferred meal being high-calorie, which we formally show is consistent with the theory of optimal expectations about risk. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effectiveness of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume about the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.
AB - We examine the causes and policy consequences of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to overengage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it, and measure their subsequent calorie intake. We find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. We find that strategically ignorant subjects downplay the health risk of their preferred meal being high-calorie, which we formally show is consistent with the theory of optimal expectations about risk. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effectiveness of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume about the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.
M3 - Working paper
T3 - IFRO Working Paper
BT - Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk
PB - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 203048630