Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review
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Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods. / Hougaard, Jens Leth.
Game theory in management accounting: Implementing incentives and fairness. ed. / David Mueller; Ralf Trost. Springer, 2018. p. 287-300 (Contributions to Management Science).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Sharing the costs of access to a set of public goods
AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth
N1 - The original version of this chapter was revised. An erratum to the chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_20
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service constraints.
AB - A group of agents share assess to a set of public goods. Each good has a cost and the total cost of all goods must be shared among the agents. Agents preferences are described by subsets of goods that provides the agent with service. As such, demands are binary, and it is further assumed that agents prefer a low cost share, but other differences in their individual preferences are irrelevant, making demand fully inelastic. The model captures central aspects of several classes of practical problems and therefore has many potential applications. The paper surveys some recent axiomatic characterizations of relevant allocation rules and provides a overview of how the problem of fair division can be approached and structured subject to the richness inherent in the description of agents service constraints.
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_13
M3 - Book chapter
SN - 978-3-319-61602-5
T3 - Contributions to Management Science
SP - 287
EP - 300
BT - Game theory in management accounting
A2 - Mueller, David
A2 - Trost, Ralf
PB - Springer
ER -
ID: 185439898