Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries. / Nielsen, Max; Flaaten, Ola; Waldö, Staffan.

In: Marine Resource Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2012, p. 65-88.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Nielsen, M, Flaaten, O & Waldö, S 2012, 'Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries', Marine Resource Economics, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 65-88. https://doi.org/10.5950/0738-1360-27.1.65

APA

Nielsen, M., Flaaten, O., & Waldö, S. (2012). Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries. Marine Resource Economics, 27(1), 65-88. https://doi.org/10.5950/0738-1360-27.1.65

Vancouver

Nielsen M, Flaaten O, Waldö S. Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries. Marine Resource Economics. 2012;27(1):65-88. https://doi.org/10.5950/0738-1360-27.1.65

Author

Nielsen, Max ; Flaaten, Ola ; Waldö, Staffan. / Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries. In: Marine Resource Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 27, No. 1. pp. 65-88.

Bibtex

@article{3682ca6e64724917906f3a063fb4787f,
title = "Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries",
abstract = "There is potential to increase the economic returns in many fisheries by improving fisheries management. In this article, maximum and estimated current resource rents are analyzed using a standardized methodology for five case studies of fisheries with different management regimes: individual quotas (Norway), individual transferable quotas (Iceland), co-management (Denmark), vessel catch limits (Sweden), and tradable days-at-sea regulation (Faroe Islands). The Danish co-managed fishery had the highest estimated current rent, corresponding to 51% of landing value compared to a maximum rent of 62%. The Danish case was followed by the Icelandic ITQ fishery (estimated current 30%, maximum 66%), Faroese tradable days-at-sea (current 28%, maximum 55%), Swedish vessel catch limits (current 3%, maximum 74%), and Norwegian individual quotas (estimated current −22%, maximum 43%). Fishery characteristics other than management might influence the estimated resource rent, and the results are discussed in relation to biological sustainability. The method used across fisheries and countries for the estimation of the current economic rent, based on standardized opportunity costs of labor and capital, exaggerates the current positive rent for the ITQ fishery and the negative rent for the individual quota fishery.",
author = "Max Nielsen and Ola Flaaten and Staffan Wald{\"o}",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.5950/0738-1360-27.1.65",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "65--88",
journal = "Marine Resource Economics",
issn = "0738-1360",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Management of and economic returns from selected fisheries in the Nordic Countries

AU - Nielsen, Max

AU - Flaaten, Ola

AU - Waldö, Staffan

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - There is potential to increase the economic returns in many fisheries by improving fisheries management. In this article, maximum and estimated current resource rents are analyzed using a standardized methodology for five case studies of fisheries with different management regimes: individual quotas (Norway), individual transferable quotas (Iceland), co-management (Denmark), vessel catch limits (Sweden), and tradable days-at-sea regulation (Faroe Islands). The Danish co-managed fishery had the highest estimated current rent, corresponding to 51% of landing value compared to a maximum rent of 62%. The Danish case was followed by the Icelandic ITQ fishery (estimated current 30%, maximum 66%), Faroese tradable days-at-sea (current 28%, maximum 55%), Swedish vessel catch limits (current 3%, maximum 74%), and Norwegian individual quotas (estimated current −22%, maximum 43%). Fishery characteristics other than management might influence the estimated resource rent, and the results are discussed in relation to biological sustainability. The method used across fisheries and countries for the estimation of the current economic rent, based on standardized opportunity costs of labor and capital, exaggerates the current positive rent for the ITQ fishery and the negative rent for the individual quota fishery.

AB - There is potential to increase the economic returns in many fisheries by improving fisheries management. In this article, maximum and estimated current resource rents are analyzed using a standardized methodology for five case studies of fisheries with different management regimes: individual quotas (Norway), individual transferable quotas (Iceland), co-management (Denmark), vessel catch limits (Sweden), and tradable days-at-sea regulation (Faroe Islands). The Danish co-managed fishery had the highest estimated current rent, corresponding to 51% of landing value compared to a maximum rent of 62%. The Danish case was followed by the Icelandic ITQ fishery (estimated current 30%, maximum 66%), Faroese tradable days-at-sea (current 28%, maximum 55%), Swedish vessel catch limits (current 3%, maximum 74%), and Norwegian individual quotas (estimated current −22%, maximum 43%). Fishery characteristics other than management might influence the estimated resource rent, and the results are discussed in relation to biological sustainability. The method used across fisheries and countries for the estimation of the current economic rent, based on standardized opportunity costs of labor and capital, exaggerates the current positive rent for the ITQ fishery and the negative rent for the individual quota fishery.

U2 - 10.5950/0738-1360-27.1.65

DO - 10.5950/0738-1360-27.1.65

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 65

EP - 88

JO - Marine Resource Economics

JF - Marine Resource Economics

SN - 0738-1360

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 46154707