A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries : liability rules and non-compliance. / Jensen, Frank; Nøstbakken, Linda.

In: Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2016, p. 371-392.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Jensen, F & Nøstbakken, L 2016, 'A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance', Environment and Development Economics, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 371-392. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X15000315

APA

Jensen, F., & Nøstbakken, L. (2016). A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance. Environment and Development Economics, 21(3), 371-392. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X15000315

Vancouver

Jensen F, Nøstbakken L. A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance. Environment and Development Economics. 2016;21(3):371-392. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X15000315

Author

Jensen, Frank ; Nøstbakken, Linda. / A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries : liability rules and non-compliance. In: Environment and Development Economics. 2016 ; Vol. 21, No. 3. pp. 371-392.

Bibtex

@article{1192f65a2b7440019d1b8d3f59d138bf,
title = "A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance",
abstract = "The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal–agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter who is held liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under various liability rules.",
author = "Frank Jensen and Linda N{\o}stbakken",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1017/S1355770X15000315",
language = "English",
volume = "21",
pages = "371--392",
journal = "Environment and Development Economics",
issn = "1355-770X",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries

T2 - liability rules and non-compliance

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Nøstbakken, Linda

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal–agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter who is held liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under various liability rules.

AB - The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal–agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter who is held liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under various liability rules.

U2 - 10.1017/S1355770X15000315

DO - 10.1017/S1355770X15000315

M3 - Journal article

VL - 21

SP - 371

EP - 392

JO - Environment and Development Economics

JF - Environment and Development Economics

SN - 1355-770X

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 160978946