Framing and misperception in public good experiments

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

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Framing and misperception in public good experiments. / Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt; Hansen, Lars Gårn; Wengström, Erik Roland.

In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 2, 2017, p. 435–456.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Fosgaard, TR, Hansen, LG & Wengström, ER 2017, 'Framing and misperception in public good experiments', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 119, no. 2, pp. 435–456. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12165

APA

Fosgaard, T. R., Hansen, L. G., & Wengström, E. R. (2017). Framing and misperception in public good experiments. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119(2), 435–456. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12165

Vancouver

Fosgaard TR, Hansen LG, Wengström ER. Framing and misperception in public good experiments. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2017;119(2):435–456. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12165

Author

Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt ; Hansen, Lars Gårn ; Wengström, Erik Roland. / Framing and misperception in public good experiments. In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2017 ; Vol. 119, No. 2. pp. 435–456.

Bibtex

@article{15e9006ffaba47b6b9af8ae36378d5c4,
title = "Framing and misperception in public good experiments",
abstract = "Earlier studies have found that framing has substantial impact on the degree of cooperation observed in public good experiments. We show that the way the public good game is framed affects misperceptions about the incentives of the game. Moreover, we show that such framing-induced differences in misperceptions are linked to the framing effect on subjects' cooperation behavior. When we do not control for the different levels of misperceptions between frames, we observe a significant framing effect on subjects{\textquoteright} cooperation preferences. However, this framing effect becomes insignificant once we remove subjects that misperceive.",
author = "Fosgaard, {Toke Reinholt} and Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn} and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",
note = "Accepted manuscript online 20 November 2015",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1111/sjoe.12165",
language = "English",
volume = "119",
pages = "435–456",
journal = "Scandinavian Journal of Economics",
issn = "0347-0520",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Framing and misperception in public good experiments

AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

N1 - Accepted manuscript online 20 November 2015

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Earlier studies have found that framing has substantial impact on the degree of cooperation observed in public good experiments. We show that the way the public good game is framed affects misperceptions about the incentives of the game. Moreover, we show that such framing-induced differences in misperceptions are linked to the framing effect on subjects' cooperation behavior. When we do not control for the different levels of misperceptions between frames, we observe a significant framing effect on subjects’ cooperation preferences. However, this framing effect becomes insignificant once we remove subjects that misperceive.

AB - Earlier studies have found that framing has substantial impact on the degree of cooperation observed in public good experiments. We show that the way the public good game is framed affects misperceptions about the incentives of the game. Moreover, we show that such framing-induced differences in misperceptions are linked to the framing effect on subjects' cooperation behavior. When we do not control for the different levels of misperceptions between frames, we observe a significant framing effect on subjects’ cooperation preferences. However, this framing effect becomes insignificant once we remove subjects that misperceive.

U2 - 10.1111/sjoe.12165

DO - 10.1111/sjoe.12165

M3 - Journal article

VL - 119

SP - 435

EP - 456

JO - Scandinavian Journal of Economics

JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics

SN - 0347-0520

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 141961203