Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Regulating groundwater use in developing countries : a feasible instrument for public intervention. / Hansen, Lars Gårn; Jensen, Frank; Amundsen, Eirik S.

In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 170, No. 2, 2014, p. 317-335.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hansen, LG, Jensen, F & Amundsen, ES 2014, 'Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 170, no. 2, pp. 317-335. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

APA

Hansen, L. G., Jensen, F., & Amundsen, E. S. (2014). Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 170(2), 317-335. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

Vancouver

Hansen LG, Jensen F, Amundsen ES. Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2014;170(2):317-335. https://doi.org/10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

Author

Hansen, Lars Gårn ; Jensen, Frank ; Amundsen, Eirik S. / Regulating groundwater use in developing countries : a feasible instrument for public intervention. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 2014 ; Vol. 170, No. 2. pp. 317-335.

Bibtex

@article{d620b075f3fb46cda8720ee539c1c6a1,
title = "Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention",
abstract = "Worldwide groundwater is a common-pool resource that is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. In developing countries the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency-inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements. The instrument we propose is a tax based on aggregate extraction rather than on individual extraction measures.",
author = "Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn} and Frank Jensen and Amundsen, {Eirik S}",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1628/093245614X13867465880983",
language = "English",
volume = "170",
pages = "317--335",
journal = "Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics",
issn = "0932-4569",
publisher = "Mohr Siebeck",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Regulating groundwater use in developing countries

T2 - a feasible instrument for public intervention

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Amundsen, Eirik S

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Worldwide groundwater is a common-pool resource that is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. In developing countries the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency-inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements. The instrument we propose is a tax based on aggregate extraction rather than on individual extraction measures.

AB - Worldwide groundwater is a common-pool resource that is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. In developing countries the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency-inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements. The instrument we propose is a tax based on aggregate extraction rather than on individual extraction measures.

U2 - 10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

DO - 10.1628/093245614X13867465880983

M3 - Journal article

VL - 170

SP - 317

EP - 335

JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

SN - 0932-4569

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 99928859