Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information. / Jensen, Frank; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark; Abildtrup, Jens; Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl; Stenger, Anne.

In: Journal of Forest Economics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2022, p. 73-101.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Jensen, F, Thorsen, BJ, Abildtrup, J, Jacobsen, JB & Stenger, A 2022, 'Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information', Journal of Forest Economics, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 73-101. https://doi.org/10.1561/112.00000541

APA

Jensen, F., Thorsen, B. J., Abildtrup, J., Jacobsen, J. B., & Stenger, A. (2022). Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information. Journal of Forest Economics, 37(1), 73-101. https://doi.org/10.1561/112.00000541

Vancouver

Jensen F, Thorsen BJ, Abildtrup J, Jacobsen JB, Stenger A. Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information. Journal of Forest Economics. 2022;37(1):73-101. https://doi.org/10.1561/112.00000541

Author

Jensen, Frank ; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark ; Abildtrup, Jens ; Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl ; Stenger, Anne. / Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information. In: Journal of Forest Economics. 2022 ; Vol. 37, No. 1. pp. 73-101.

Bibtex

@article{b4cc9a4e13324939a0c8150c6ccef9f4,
title = "Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information",
abstract = "In this paper, we study voluntary subsidies offered to forest owners to increase rotation periods. We assume that a forest owner takes private amenity values into account when making decisions, but these values are lower than the social amenity values; therefore, an amenity value externality arises. Furthermore, the regulator has imperfect information regarding the timber profit of the forest owner. We show that voluntary subsidies must reflect the difference between (a) private and social amenity values and (b) timber profit among the possible types of the forest owner. In this way, we solve the amenity value externality and the problem of imperfect information about timber profit in a second-best optimal way. We have also investigated what happens if the regulator excludes private amenity values when fixing voluntary subsidies and we show that two sources of efficiency losses arise: (a) non-optimal rotation periods and (b) non-truthful revelation of private information.",
author = "Frank Jensen and Thorsen, {Bo Jellesmark} and Jens Abildtrup and Jacobsen, {Jette Bredahl} and Anne Stenger",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 F. Jensen, B. J. Thorsen, J. Abildtrup, J. B. Jacobsen and A. Stenger.",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1561/112.00000541",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "73--101",
journal = "Journal of Forest Economics",
issn = "1104-6899",
publisher = "Elsevier GmbH - Urban und Fischer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Designing voluntary subsidies for forest owners under imperfect information

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark

AU - Abildtrup, Jens

AU - Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl

AU - Stenger, Anne

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 F. Jensen, B. J. Thorsen, J. Abildtrup, J. B. Jacobsen and A. Stenger.

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - In this paper, we study voluntary subsidies offered to forest owners to increase rotation periods. We assume that a forest owner takes private amenity values into account when making decisions, but these values are lower than the social amenity values; therefore, an amenity value externality arises. Furthermore, the regulator has imperfect information regarding the timber profit of the forest owner. We show that voluntary subsidies must reflect the difference between (a) private and social amenity values and (b) timber profit among the possible types of the forest owner. In this way, we solve the amenity value externality and the problem of imperfect information about timber profit in a second-best optimal way. We have also investigated what happens if the regulator excludes private amenity values when fixing voluntary subsidies and we show that two sources of efficiency losses arise: (a) non-optimal rotation periods and (b) non-truthful revelation of private information.

AB - In this paper, we study voluntary subsidies offered to forest owners to increase rotation periods. We assume that a forest owner takes private amenity values into account when making decisions, but these values are lower than the social amenity values; therefore, an amenity value externality arises. Furthermore, the regulator has imperfect information regarding the timber profit of the forest owner. We show that voluntary subsidies must reflect the difference between (a) private and social amenity values and (b) timber profit among the possible types of the forest owner. In this way, we solve the amenity value externality and the problem of imperfect information about timber profit in a second-best optimal way. We have also investigated what happens if the regulator excludes private amenity values when fixing voluntary subsidies and we show that two sources of efficiency losses arise: (a) non-optimal rotation periods and (b) non-truthful revelation of private information.

U2 - 10.1561/112.00000541

DO - 10.1561/112.00000541

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85124360193

VL - 37

SP - 73

EP - 101

JO - Journal of Forest Economics

JF - Journal of Forest Economics

SN - 1104-6899

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 300444454