Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction

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Standard

Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction. / Hansen, Lars Gårn; Jensen, Frank; Russell, Clifford .

In: Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2013, p. 135-147.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hansen, LG, Jensen, F & Russell, C 2013, 'Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction', Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 135-147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001

APA

Hansen, L. G., Jensen, F., & Russell, C. (2013). Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction. Resource and Energy Economics, 35(2), 135-147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001

Vancouver

Hansen LG, Jensen F, Russell C. Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction. Resource and Energy Economics. 2013;35(2):135-147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001

Author

Hansen, Lars Gårn ; Jensen, Frank ; Russell, Clifford . / Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction. In: Resource and Energy Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 35, No. 2. pp. 135-147.

Bibtex

@article{9d8fe94121e44ac4b5f37b12a5217f7e,
title = "Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction",
abstract = "In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.",
author = "Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn} and Frank Jensen and Clifford Russell",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "135--147",
journal = "Resource and Energy Economics",
issn = "0928-7655",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Russell, Clifford

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

AB - In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

U2 - 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001

DO - 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001

M3 - Journal article

VL - 35

SP - 135

EP - 147

JO - Resource and Energy Economics

JF - Resource and Energy Economics

SN - 0928-7655

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 44309901