TY - UNPB

T1 - Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Russell, Clifford

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

AB - In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - FOI Working Paper

BT - Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction

PB - Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -