Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty. / Hansen, Lars Gårn.

Frederiksberg : Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2012. p. 1-42.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Hansen, LG 2012 'Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty' Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, pp. 1-42. <http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2012_3>

APA

Hansen, L. G. (2012). Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty. (pp. 1-42). Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. FOI Working Paper No. 2012/3 http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:foi:wpaper:2012_3

Vancouver

Hansen LG. Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty. Frederiksberg: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2012, p. 1-42.

Author

Hansen, Lars Gårn. / Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty. Frederiksberg : Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2012. pp. 1-42 (FOI Working Paper; No. 2012/3).

Bibtex

@techreport{7e53f3a28f2346b29000803ac3767067,
title = "Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty",
abstract = "Renewable natural resources (like water, fish and wildlife stocks, forests and grazing lands) are critical for the livelihood of millions of people and understanding how they can be managed efficiently is an important economic problem. I show how regulator uncertainty about different economic and ecological parts of the harvesting system affect the optimal choice of instrument for regulating harvesters. I bring prior results into a unified framework and add to these by showing that: 1) quotas are preferred under ecological uncertainty if there are substantial diseconomies of scale in harvesting, 2) that a pro-quota result under uncertainty about prices and marginal costs is unlikely, requiring that the resource growth function is highly concave locally around the optimum and, 3) that quotas are always preferred if uncertainly about underlying structural economic parameters dominates. These results showing that quotas are preferred in a number of situations qualify the pro fee message dominating prior studies.",
author = "Hansen, {Lars G{\aa}rn}",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
series = "FOI Working Paper",
publisher = "Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",
number = "2012/3",
pages = "1--42",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty

AU - Hansen, Lars Gårn

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Renewable natural resources (like water, fish and wildlife stocks, forests and grazing lands) are critical for the livelihood of millions of people and understanding how they can be managed efficiently is an important economic problem. I show how regulator uncertainty about different economic and ecological parts of the harvesting system affect the optimal choice of instrument for regulating harvesters. I bring prior results into a unified framework and add to these by showing that: 1) quotas are preferred under ecological uncertainty if there are substantial diseconomies of scale in harvesting, 2) that a pro-quota result under uncertainty about prices and marginal costs is unlikely, requiring that the resource growth function is highly concave locally around the optimum and, 3) that quotas are always preferred if uncertainly about underlying structural economic parameters dominates. These results showing that quotas are preferred in a number of situations qualify the pro fee message dominating prior studies.

AB - Renewable natural resources (like water, fish and wildlife stocks, forests and grazing lands) are critical for the livelihood of millions of people and understanding how they can be managed efficiently is an important economic problem. I show how regulator uncertainty about different economic and ecological parts of the harvesting system affect the optimal choice of instrument for regulating harvesters. I bring prior results into a unified framework and add to these by showing that: 1) quotas are preferred under ecological uncertainty if there are substantial diseconomies of scale in harvesting, 2) that a pro-quota result under uncertainty about prices and marginal costs is unlikely, requiring that the resource growth function is highly concave locally around the optimum and, 3) that quotas are always preferred if uncertainly about underlying structural economic parameters dominates. These results showing that quotas are preferred in a number of situations qualify the pro fee message dominating prior studies.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - FOI Working Paper

SP - 1

EP - 42

BT - Regulating renewable resources under uncertainty

PB - Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

CY - Frederiksberg

ER -

ID: 47203060