The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Jensen, Frank; Smilgins, Aleksandrs.

In: Strategic Behavior and the Environment, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2020, p. 169-218.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Hougaard, JL, Jensen, F & Smilgins, A 2020, 'The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis', Strategic Behavior and the Environment, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 169-218. https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000092

APA

Hougaard, J. L., Jensen, F., & Smilgins, A. (2020). The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis. Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 8(2), 169-218. https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000092

Vancouver

Hougaard JL, Jensen F, Smilgins A. The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis. Strategic Behavior and the Environment. 2020;8(2):169-218. https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000092

Author

Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Jensen, Frank ; Smilgins, Aleksandrs. / The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis. In: Strategic Behavior and the Environment. 2020 ; Vol. 8, No. 2. pp. 169-218.

Bibtex

@article{8b3de922d70242188747ed057963bfa2,
title = "The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis",
abstract = "From 2010 and onwards, a crisis has occurred over the distribution of a yearly total allowable catch (TAC) for the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic Sea. The European Union (the EU), Norway (NO), Iceland (IC) and the Faroe Islands (the FI) are players in this {"}mackerel crisis{"}. In the present study, we use game theory in an attempt to rationalize the actual behaviour of these players during the mackerel crisis. We identify the profit of each possible coalition structure (the coalitional values) by using a fisheries economic model, and quantify the coalitional values empirically by statistical estimation of the relevant functional relationships. Based on the statistical estimations, we define a benchmark scenario and conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. To try to rationalize the outcome during the mackerel crisis, we require that a relevant coalition must be internally stable in the sense that no structure has an incentive to split up. By using the notion of internal stability, we are partly able to rationalize the actual coalition formation during the mackerel crisis.",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and Frank Jensen and Aleksandrs Smilgins",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1561/102.00000092",
language = "English",
volume = "8",
pages = "169--218",
journal = "Strategic Behavior and the Environment",
issn = "1944-012X",
publisher = "Now Publishers Inc",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Crisis

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Smilgins, Aleksandrs

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - From 2010 and onwards, a crisis has occurred over the distribution of a yearly total allowable catch (TAC) for the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic Sea. The European Union (the EU), Norway (NO), Iceland (IC) and the Faroe Islands (the FI) are players in this "mackerel crisis". In the present study, we use game theory in an attempt to rationalize the actual behaviour of these players during the mackerel crisis. We identify the profit of each possible coalition structure (the coalitional values) by using a fisheries economic model, and quantify the coalitional values empirically by statistical estimation of the relevant functional relationships. Based on the statistical estimations, we define a benchmark scenario and conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. To try to rationalize the outcome during the mackerel crisis, we require that a relevant coalition must be internally stable in the sense that no structure has an incentive to split up. By using the notion of internal stability, we are partly able to rationalize the actual coalition formation during the mackerel crisis.

AB - From 2010 and onwards, a crisis has occurred over the distribution of a yearly total allowable catch (TAC) for the mackerel fishery in the Northeast Atlantic Sea. The European Union (the EU), Norway (NO), Iceland (IC) and the Faroe Islands (the FI) are players in this "mackerel crisis". In the present study, we use game theory in an attempt to rationalize the actual behaviour of these players during the mackerel crisis. We identify the profit of each possible coalition structure (the coalitional values) by using a fisheries economic model, and quantify the coalitional values empirically by statistical estimation of the relevant functional relationships. Based on the statistical estimations, we define a benchmark scenario and conduct a number of sensitivity analyses. To try to rationalize the outcome during the mackerel crisis, we require that a relevant coalition must be internally stable in the sense that no structure has an incentive to split up. By using the notion of internal stability, we are partly able to rationalize the actual coalition formation during the mackerel crisis.

U2 - 10.1561/102.00000092

DO - 10.1561/102.00000092

M3 - Journal article

VL - 8

SP - 169

EP - 218

JO - Strategic Behavior and the Environment

JF - Strategic Behavior and the Environment

SN - 1944-012X

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 239917327