Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks

Research output: Working paper › Research

Standard

Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Tvede, Mich.

Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2020.

Research output: Working paper › Research

Harvard

Hougaard, JL & Tvede, M 2020 'Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks' Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Hougaard, J. L., & Tvede, M. (2020). Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. IFRO Working Paper No. 2020/06

Vancouver

Hougaard JL, Tvede M. Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2020.

Author

Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Tvede, Mich. / Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks. Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2020. (IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2020/06).

Bibtex

@techreport{46f074c503a645bcbd53ae58cc05dba9,
title = "Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks",
abstract = "We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents are fully informed, the planner is ignorant. The options for full implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria are studied. We simplify strategy sets without changing the set of Nash implementable correspondences. We show the correspondence of consisting of welfare maximizing networks and individually rational cost allocations is implementable. We construct a minimal Nash implementable desirable solution in the set of upper hemi-continuous and Nash implementable solutions. It is not possible to implement solutions such a the Shapley value unless we settle for partial implementation.",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and Mich Tvede",
year = "2020",
language = "English",
series = "IFRO Working Paper ",
number = "2020/06",
publisher = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

AU - Tvede, Mich

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents are fully informed, the planner is ignorant. The options for full implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria are studied. We simplify strategy sets without changing the set of Nash implementable correspondences. We show the correspondence of consisting of welfare maximizing networks and individually rational cost allocations is implementable. We construct a minimal Nash implementable desirable solution in the set of upper hemi-continuous and Nash implementable solutions. It is not possible to implement solutions such a the Shapley value unless we settle for partial implementation.

AB - We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents are fully informed, the planner is ignorant. The options for full implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria are studied. We simplify strategy sets without changing the set of Nash implementable correspondences. We show the correspondence of consisting of welfare maximizing networks and individually rational cost allocations is implementable. We construct a minimal Nash implementable desirable solution in the set of upper hemi-continuous and Nash implementable solutions. It is not possible to implement solutions such a the Shapley value unless we settle for partial implementation.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - IFRO Working Paper

BT - Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks

PB - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 244278337