Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation: Evidence from the Australian food sector

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Standard

Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation : Evidence from the Australian food sector. / Daugbjerg, Carsten.

I: Australian Journal of Public Administration, Bind 81, Nr. 1, 2022, s. 37-52.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Daugbjerg, C 2022, 'Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation: Evidence from the Australian food sector', Australian Journal of Public Administration, bind 81, nr. 1, s. 37-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12452

APA

Daugbjerg, C. (2022). Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation: Evidence from the Australian food sector. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 81(1), 37-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12452

Vancouver

Daugbjerg C. Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation: Evidence from the Australian food sector. Australian Journal of Public Administration. 2022;81(1):37-52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12452

Author

Daugbjerg, Carsten. / Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation : Evidence from the Australian food sector. I: Australian Journal of Public Administration. 2022 ; Bind 81, Nr. 1. s. 37-52.

Bibtex

@article{b398d1d3427b470b9ba859778ee77588,
title = "Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation: Evidence from the Australian food sector",
abstract = "With the proliferation of private regulation of food safety, governments have shown interests in engaging private schemes as co-regulators. This raises the issue of accountability in private schemes; that is holding the bodies auditing the standards accountable. The ability to do so affects the integrity of private regulatory schemes. Holding auditors accountable can be conceived of as a principal-agent problem. This article analyses the two most widely used global private food safety standard schemes in the Australian food sector. The analysis shows that the existence of well-developed accountability mechanisms and multiple principals has resulted in a multi-layered and comprehensive system of accountability. Hence, holding auditors accountable to their principals does not appear to be a concern for governments considering to engage in co-regulatory arrangements with private schemes. However, concerns about integrity have been raised. The prescriptive nature of the standards and the multitude of standard schemes with their own accountability arrangements has brought about a situation in which the individual auditors have to devote disproportionately much time to respond to the accountability mechanisms.",
keywords = "accountability, co&#8208, regulation, food safety, multiple principals, private regulation, GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS, STANDARDS, CONFLICT, ENOUGH, ROLES",
author = "Carsten Daugbjerg",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1111/1467-8500.12452",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "37--52",
journal = "Australian Journal of Public Administration",
issn = "0313-6647",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Accountability and integrity in private food safety regulation

T2 - Evidence from the Australian food sector

AU - Daugbjerg, Carsten

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - With the proliferation of private regulation of food safety, governments have shown interests in engaging private schemes as co-regulators. This raises the issue of accountability in private schemes; that is holding the bodies auditing the standards accountable. The ability to do so affects the integrity of private regulatory schemes. Holding auditors accountable can be conceived of as a principal-agent problem. This article analyses the two most widely used global private food safety standard schemes in the Australian food sector. The analysis shows that the existence of well-developed accountability mechanisms and multiple principals has resulted in a multi-layered and comprehensive system of accountability. Hence, holding auditors accountable to their principals does not appear to be a concern for governments considering to engage in co-regulatory arrangements with private schemes. However, concerns about integrity have been raised. The prescriptive nature of the standards and the multitude of standard schemes with their own accountability arrangements has brought about a situation in which the individual auditors have to devote disproportionately much time to respond to the accountability mechanisms.

AB - With the proliferation of private regulation of food safety, governments have shown interests in engaging private schemes as co-regulators. This raises the issue of accountability in private schemes; that is holding the bodies auditing the standards accountable. The ability to do so affects the integrity of private regulatory schemes. Holding auditors accountable can be conceived of as a principal-agent problem. This article analyses the two most widely used global private food safety standard schemes in the Australian food sector. The analysis shows that the existence of well-developed accountability mechanisms and multiple principals has resulted in a multi-layered and comprehensive system of accountability. Hence, holding auditors accountable to their principals does not appear to be a concern for governments considering to engage in co-regulatory arrangements with private schemes. However, concerns about integrity have been raised. The prescriptive nature of the standards and the multitude of standard schemes with their own accountability arrangements has brought about a situation in which the individual auditors have to devote disproportionately much time to respond to the accountability mechanisms.

KW - accountability

KW - co&#8208

KW - regulation

KW - food safety

KW - multiple principals

KW - private regulation

KW - GOVERNANCE

KW - INSTITUTIONS

KW - STANDARDS

KW - CONFLICT

KW - ENOUGH

KW - ROLES

U2 - 10.1111/1467-8500.12452

DO - 10.1111/1467-8500.12452

M3 - Journal article

VL - 81

SP - 37

EP - 52

JO - Australian Journal of Public Administration

JF - Australian Journal of Public Administration

SN - 0313-6647

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 251575412