Forest rights: the hard currency of REDD+

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Standard

Forest rights : the hard currency of REDD+. / Balooni, Kulbhushan; Lund, Jens Friis.

I: Conservation Letters, Bind 7, Nr. 3, 2014, s. 278-284.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Balooni, K & Lund, JF 2014, 'Forest rights: the hard currency of REDD+', Conservation Letters, bind 7, nr. 3, s. 278-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12067

APA

Balooni, K., & Lund, J. F. (2014). Forest rights: the hard currency of REDD+. Conservation Letters, 7(3), 278-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12067

Vancouver

Balooni K, Lund JF. Forest rights: the hard currency of REDD+. Conservation Letters. 2014;7(3):278-284. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12067

Author

Balooni, Kulbhushan ; Lund, Jens Friis. / Forest rights : the hard currency of REDD+. I: Conservation Letters. 2014 ; Bind 7, Nr. 3. s. 278-284.

Bibtex

@article{8887cf035ca14a0ca944ac1cd0a5f648,
title = "Forest rights: the hard currency of REDD+",
abstract = "One of the proposed strategies for implementation of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus (REDD+) is to incentivize conservation of forests managed by communities under decentralized forest management. Yet, we argue that this is a challenging road to REDD+ because of three general characteristics of forests under existing decentralized management regimes. First, these forests already accumulate biomass and, in some cases, generate leakage, which threatens to undercut REDD+ additionality. Second, these forests are many and small, which will drive up REDD+ transactions costs. Third, beyond the “conservation islands” represented by forests under decentralized management, processes of deforestation and forest degradation continue. Given these challenges, we argue that REDD+ efforts through decentralized forestry should be redirected from incentivizing further conservation of forests under existing decentralized management arrangements toward a push for extending the coverage of forests under decentralized management, making forest rights the hard currency of REDD+.",
author = "Kulbhushan Balooni and Lund, {Jens Friis}",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1111/conl.12067",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "278--284",
journal = "Conservation Letters",
issn = "1755-263X",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Forest rights

T2 - the hard currency of REDD+

AU - Balooni, Kulbhushan

AU - Lund, Jens Friis

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - One of the proposed strategies for implementation of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus (REDD+) is to incentivize conservation of forests managed by communities under decentralized forest management. Yet, we argue that this is a challenging road to REDD+ because of three general characteristics of forests under existing decentralized management regimes. First, these forests already accumulate biomass and, in some cases, generate leakage, which threatens to undercut REDD+ additionality. Second, these forests are many and small, which will drive up REDD+ transactions costs. Third, beyond the “conservation islands” represented by forests under decentralized management, processes of deforestation and forest degradation continue. Given these challenges, we argue that REDD+ efforts through decentralized forestry should be redirected from incentivizing further conservation of forests under existing decentralized management arrangements toward a push for extending the coverage of forests under decentralized management, making forest rights the hard currency of REDD+.

AB - One of the proposed strategies for implementation of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus (REDD+) is to incentivize conservation of forests managed by communities under decentralized forest management. Yet, we argue that this is a challenging road to REDD+ because of three general characteristics of forests under existing decentralized management regimes. First, these forests already accumulate biomass and, in some cases, generate leakage, which threatens to undercut REDD+ additionality. Second, these forests are many and small, which will drive up REDD+ transactions costs. Third, beyond the “conservation islands” represented by forests under decentralized management, processes of deforestation and forest degradation continue. Given these challenges, we argue that REDD+ efforts through decentralized forestry should be redirected from incentivizing further conservation of forests under existing decentralized management arrangements toward a push for extending the coverage of forests under decentralized management, making forest rights the hard currency of REDD+.

U2 - 10.1111/conl.12067

DO - 10.1111/conl.12067

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 278

EP - 284

JO - Conservation Letters

JF - Conservation Letters

SN - 1755-263X

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 126010822