Precaution, threshold risk and public deliberation
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Precaution, threshold risk and public deliberation. / Holm, Sune.
I: Bioethics, Bind 33/2 , 2019, s. 254-260.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Precaution, threshold risk and public deliberation
AU - Holm, Sune
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - It has been argued that the precautionary principle is incoherent and thus useless as a guide for regulatory policy. In a recent paper in Bioethics, Wareham and Nardini propose a response to the ‘precautionary paradox’ according to which the precautionary principle's usefulness for decision making in policy and regulation contexts can be justified by appeal to a probability threshold discriminating between negligible and non-negligible risks. It would be of great significance to debates about risk and precaution if there were a sound method for determining a minimum probability threshold of negligible risk. This is what Wareham and Nardini aim to do. The novelty of their approach is that they suggest that such a threshold should be determined by a method of public deliberation. In this article I discuss the merits of Wareham and Nardini’s public deliberation method for determining thresholds. I raise an epistemic worry about the public deliberation method they suggest, and argue that their proposal is inadequate due to a hidden assumption that the acceptability of a risk can be completely analysed in terms of its probability.
AB - It has been argued that the precautionary principle is incoherent and thus useless as a guide for regulatory policy. In a recent paper in Bioethics, Wareham and Nardini propose a response to the ‘precautionary paradox’ according to which the precautionary principle's usefulness for decision making in policy and regulation contexts can be justified by appeal to a probability threshold discriminating between negligible and non-negligible risks. It would be of great significance to debates about risk and precaution if there were a sound method for determining a minimum probability threshold of negligible risk. This is what Wareham and Nardini aim to do. The novelty of their approach is that they suggest that such a threshold should be determined by a method of public deliberation. In this article I discuss the merits of Wareham and Nardini’s public deliberation method for determining thresholds. I raise an epistemic worry about the public deliberation method they suggest, and argue that their proposal is inadequate due to a hidden assumption that the acceptability of a risk can be completely analysed in terms of its probability.
KW - ethics
KW - precautionary principle
KW - precautionary regulation
KW - public deliberation
KW - risk
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85052634758&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/bioe.12488
DO - 10.1111/bioe.12488
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 30125957
AN - SCOPUS:85052634758
VL - 33/2
SP - 254
EP - 260
JO - Bioethics
JF - Bioethics
SN - 0269-9702
ER -
ID: 209711779