Quota enforcement in resource industries: self-reporting and differentiated inspections
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
However, in many industries there is concern about the basic eectiveness of quotas due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with signicant non-compliance and exogenous constraints on nes and enforcement budget. We propose a new enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit dierentiation of inspection rates based on compliance history. We show that such a system increases the eectiveness of quota management by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under the traditional enforcement system, while ensuring an ecient allocation of aggregate extraction.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Udgiver | Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen |
Udgave | Revised may 2011 |
Antal sider | 32 |
Status | Udgivet - 2011 |
Navn | FOI Working Paper |
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Nummer | 2010/10 |
ID: 33028446