Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftMarine Resource Economics
Vol/bind31
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)233-257
Antal sider25
ISSN0738-1360
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2016

ID: 160979291