River pollution abatement: Decentralized solutions and smart contracts
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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River pollution abatement : Decentralized solutions and smart contracts. / Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth.
Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2021.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - River pollution abatement
T2 - Decentralized solutions and smart contracts
AU - Gudmundsson, Jens
AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - In river systems, costly upstream pollution abatement creates downstream welfare gains. Absentadequate agreement on how to share the gains, upstream regions lack incentives to reduce pollutionlevels. We develop a model that makes explicit the impact of water quality on productionbenefits and suggest a solution for sharing the gains of optimal pollution abatement, namely theShapley value of an underlying convex cooperative game. We provide a decentralized implementationthrough a smart contract to automate negotiations. It ensures a socially optimal agreementsupported by fair compensations to regions that turn to cleaner production from those that pollute.
AB - In river systems, costly upstream pollution abatement creates downstream welfare gains. Absentadequate agreement on how to share the gains, upstream regions lack incentives to reduce pollutionlevels. We develop a model that makes explicit the impact of water quality on productionbenefits and suggest a solution for sharing the gains of optimal pollution abatement, namely theShapley value of an underlying convex cooperative game. We provide a decentralized implementationthrough a smart contract to automate negotiations. It ensures a socially optimal agreementsupported by fair compensations to regions that turn to cleaner production from those that pollute.
M3 - Working paper
T3 - IFRO Working Paper
BT - River pollution abatement
PB - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 280233276